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Abstract
This paper examines whether the motivation of institutional investors in moni-
toring a firm is positively related to the relative importance of the firm’s stock in
their portfolios. We find that greater motivated monitoring institutional ownership is
associated with a higher marginal value of corporate cash holdings, which cannot be
explained by other corporate governance measures and institution types. Further, we
find that the economic effect of institutional monitoring on the marginal value of cash
falls with decreasing institutions’ monitoring motivation. Based on these findings,
we construct a monitoring motivation-weighted institutional ownership measure and
document a positive relation between it and the marginal value of cash. Our results
are robust after controlling for the endogeneity of institutional ownership, three cash
regimes, firm size, and changes in US public firms over time.
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1. Introduction
By the end of the fiscal year 2015, the aggregate cash holdings reported by non-
financial and non-utility firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ,
and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) had reached $2.3 trillion, representing 22.4%
of total firm assets and equivalent to 12.5% of annual US GDP. Firms may hold more
cash or other liquid assets for the precautionary motive should they face higher cash flow
uncertainty, market competition, or credit constraints (e.g., Haushalter et al., 2007; Bates
et al., 2009; Harford et al., 2014). However, the use of cash is mainly at the managers’
discretion. Firm managers may either directly take the cash in the form of perks or excessive
salaries, or invest it in projects that do not maximize shareholders’ profits. Therefore, the
managerial agency problems may reduce the value of corporate cash holdings.
This paper studies how institutional investor attention affects their governance role
in monitoring corporate cash holdings. With the growth of institutional investors in the
US stock market, large shareholders are likely to be active in firm governance.1 Previous
studies have usually measured institutional monitoring by total institutional ownership
or the ownership of institutional investors with similar characteristics, such as institution
types, investment horizon, activeness in the engagement with firms, and a certain ownership
threshold (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Chen et al., 2007; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Cronqvist and
Fahlenbrach, 2009). However, institutional investors hold a large number of stocks in their
portfolio.2 Recent theoretical and empirical studies support the view that institutional
investor attention is a scarce resource (Sims, 2003; Kacperczyk et al., 2016; Kempf et al.,
2017). If the optimal level of monitoring attention to a holding firm is determined by the
trade-off between monitoring benefits and costs, it may not be optimal for institutional
investors to distribute their monitoring attention evenly to all the stocks in their portfolios.
Fich et al. (2015) show that in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), the monitoring attention of
1Edmans and Holderness (2016) provide a detailed survey of previous studies on the role of large
shareholders in corporate governance.
2On average, an institutional investor’s portfolio included 219 stocks during 1980–2010 (Zeng, 2016).
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institutional investors to a target firm is positively associated with the relative importance
of the firm’s stock in their portfolios. Following Fich et al. (2015), we define a firm’s
most motivated monitoring institutional investors as those whose holding values in the
firm account for the top 10% of their portfolios.3 If motivated monitoring institutional
investors are indeed more actively engaging in firm governance than other institutional
investors, then the market perceived value of cash should be higher for firms with greater
motivated monitoring institutional ownership (IO).
To test the institutional investor limited attention hypothesis, we examine the fol-
lowing three research questions. First, is there a negative relation between institutional
monitoring attention and the relative importance of firms in their portfolios? Second,
does our measure of monitoring motivation vary across different institution types? Third,
does motivated monitoring IO differ from other traditional corporate governance measures?
There are several advantages of using the marginal value of cash as an empirical setting to
answer these questions. First, the effect of motivated monitoring IO on the marginal value
of cash can be measured by a dollar value perceived by stock market participants. Second,
the pecuniary numbers documented in our panel sample not only contain time-varying and
cross-section-varying information on the value of institutional monitoring, but also pro-
vide us with an empirical framework to examine how institutional investors allocate their
monitoring attention to all firms in their portfolios. Lastly, conflicts of interest between
shareholders and managers may cause firms to invest cash inefficiently (e.g., Jensen, 1986;
Harford et al., 2008), so it is naturally to study whether and to what extent motivated
monitoring institutional investors impinge on the value of corporate cash holdings.
Our sample includes 67,404 firm-year observations from the Centre for Research in
Security (CRSP)/Compustat Merged dataset over the period 1995–2015. To quantify
the effect of motivated monitoring institutional investors on firm cash holdings, we adopt
Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) specification and estimate the change in firm market value
3Later in the paper, we extend the top 10% cutoff and construct a general monitoring motivation-
weighted institutional ownership measure. Therefore we append “most” to motivated monitoring institu-
tional investors.
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associated with a change of one dollar in cash holdings.4 We find strong evidence that the
marginal value of cash increases with most motivated monitoring IO. Controlling for other
factors, a one standard deviation increase in most motivated monitoring IO is associated
with a 9.2 cents higher marginal value of cash. This economic effect is even stronger if
we replace most motivated monitoring IO by either the ratio of the numbers of the most
motivated monitoring institutional investors to the numbers of total institutional investors
(23.7 cents), or the natural log of one plus the numbers of the most motivated monitoring
institutional investors (19.9 cents).
We next examine whether the positive effect of most motivated monitoring IO on the
marginal value of cash can be explained by other traditional firm governance measures.
We use four proxies following the previous literature: Gompers et al.’s (2003) G-index,
Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) E-index, total institutional ownership, and blockholder ownership.
The positive relation between the most motivated monitoring IO and the marginal value
of cash remains statistically and economically significant after controlling for both anti-
takeover indexes and other institutional ownership measures. More importantly, total
institutional ownership and blockholder ownership do not have a significantly positive
effect on the marginal value of cash in addition to the most motivated monitoring IO. This
suggests that the motivation of an institutional investor to monitor a firm is more related
to how important the firm is to the investor than how important the investor is to the firm.
Our findings show that the role of the most motivated institutional investors in monitoring
firm cash holdings is unlikely to be driven by the traditional firm governance measures.
We also try to determine whether our measure of institutional monitoring motivation
may only be applied to a particular type of institution. According to Brickley et al.’s
(1988) classification, we find that both independent and grey most motivated institutional
investors have a positive association with the marginal value of cash. We further use
Bushee’s (1998) classification and show that all three types of most motivated monitoring
4In this paper, we use “the marginal value of cash” and “the change in firm market value associated
with a change of one dollar in cash holdings” interchangeably.
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IO have a positive effect on the marginal value of cash, while the effect is only statistically
significant for transient and quasi-indexer institutions. Our findings indicate that insti-
tutions, whose monitoring role is believed to be ineffective due to the potential business
ties (grey) and short investment horizon (transient), still have a positive contribution in
monitoring firms that are relatively important in their portfolios.
To explore how an institutional investor’s monitoring attention to a firm changes
with the firm’s market value weight in the portfolio, we sort all firms in an institutional
investor’s portfolio into ten decile groups by their descending market value weight in the
portfolio. We extend Fich et al.’s (2015) 10% threshold and examine the allocation of
monitoring attention to all the stocks in institutional portfolios. The institutional investor’s
monitoring attention should be higher for firms in the top decile group than for those in the
bottom decile group. If firm i is assigned in the decile group j of an institutional investor’s
portfolio, we classify the institutional investor as a class j investor in firm i, where j is from
1 to 10. Next, we identify all class j investors in firm i and define the total ownership of
these investors as MMIOi,j, motivated monitoring IOi,j. Our prediction is that MMIOi,1
(MMIOi,10) should denote the ownership of institutional investors who have the strongest
(weakest) motivation to monitor firm i.5 Consistent with this prediction, we document that
the positive effect of IO on the marginal value of cash decreases with institutional investors’
monitoring motivation. The two highest classes (MMIOi,1 and MMIOi,2) are positively
related to the marginal value of cash, and the relation is statistically significant. The
relation between the ownership of classes 3–5 (MMIOi,3 to MMIOi,5) and the marginal
value cash is not statistically significant. The relation between the ownership of classes
6–10 (MMIOi,6 to MMIOi,10) and the marginal value of cash is negative and statistically
significant.
We conduct a battery of robustness tests. First, our main results are robust af-
ter accounting for the endogeneity issues arising from unobserved firm characteristics and
potential investor self-selection bias. We employ three identifications to mitigate any endo-
5MMIOi,1 and most motivated monitoring IO are used interchangeably in the rest of our paper.
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geneity issues: (1) two-stage least squares (2SLS) with instrumental variables (IVs) based
on the Russell index reconstitution, (2) high-dimensional fixed effects, and (3) the change in
the motivated monitoring IO. Second, we use the weight of a stock in institutional portfolios
as a proxy for institutional monitoring motivation and construct a monitoring motivation-
weighted IO. We document a positive relation between the monitoring motivation-weighted
IO and the marginal value of cash. Third, Halford et al. (2016) indicate that it is important
to control for cash regimes when researchers study the effect of corporate governance on
the marginal value of cash. We find that the positive effect of MMIOi,1 on the marginal
value of cash remains positive and statistically significant in the raising cash and distribut-
ing cash regimes. Fourth, we examine whether firms actually benefit from institutional
monitoring and show that the most motivated monitoring institutional investors may im-
prove the operating performance of firms through monitoring firm cash holdings. Fifth,
the positive relation between MMIOi,1 and the marginal value of cash remains robust
after controlling for firm size and its interaction with the change in cash. Sixth, we follow
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and estimate the value of firm excess cash holdings using
Fama and French’s (1998) empirical method. We find that MMIOi,1 is positively related
to the value of firm excess cash holdings.
Finally, we examine how the relation between motivated monitoring IO and the
marginal value of cash is influenced by the changes in US public companies over our sample
period. As Kahle and Stulz (2017) point out, US public firms have changed their policies
and firm characteristics notably during 1975–2015. For example, US public companies’ in-
stitutional ownership, cash holding, age, R&D expenses, intangible assets, and profitability
are very different in 2015 compared to those in 1975 or 1995. When we examine the mon-
itoring role of motivated institutional investors, it is important to take into consideration
the consequence of the changes in firms during our sample period. Motivated by Kahle and
Stulz’s (2017) findings, we conduct sub-sample analyses for firms over two sample periods:
1995–2004 and 2005–2015. We also conduct sub-sample analyses for firms with high and
low cash holdings, age, R&D expenses, intangible assets, and profitability, respectively.
6
We find that the relation between motivated monitoring IO and the marginal value of cash
remains positive and statistically significant in all sub-samples.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we add to the emerging literature show-
ing that institutional monitoring attention affects their monitoring effectiveness. In par-
ticular, Fich et al. (2015) find that M&A deal premiums and completion probabilities are
positively associated with the most motivated monitoring IO of target firms. Liu et al.
(2016) and Kempf et al. (2017) use the exogenous shocks to unrelated firms’ stocks in an
institutional investor’s portfolio as a proxy for the distraction that may divert the insti-
tutional investor’s monitoring attention to a firm. We contribute to this line of research
by generalizing Fich et al.’s (2015) study of M&A targets to US public firms. We show
the positive impact of institutional monitoring attention on the marginal value of corpo-
rate cash holdings, as well as the mechanisms through which this outcome manifests itself.
More importantly, our empirical setting helps us to examine the allocation of institutional
monitoring attention among all stocks in their portfolios. We show that institutional in-
vestors’ monitoring attention to a firm drops monotonically when the relative importance
of the firm’s stock decreases in their portfolios.
Second, we shed light on two ongoing debates. The first debate addresses on the
role of passive institutional investors in corporate governance. Some previous studies sug-
gest that passive institutional investors weaken firm corporate governance (e.g., Schmidt
and Fahlenbrach, 2016), while others argue that they can still contribute to shareholder
activisim (e.g., Appel et al., 2016a,b). Our paper contributes to this debate by provid-
ing evidence that both active and passive institutional investors effectively monitor firms
that are relatively important in their portfolios. The second debate concerns the value
of cash. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that corporate governance measured by
anti-takeover indexes and blockholder ownership improves the marginal value of corporate
cash holdings. However, Halford et al. (2016) show that the positive relation between cor-
porate governance and the marginal value of cash is not robust after accounting for ex post
classified cash regimes. We find that not only does motivated monitoring IO improve the
7
marginal value of cash after controlling for the anti-takeover indexes and blockholder own-
ership, but also that this positive effect remains statistically significant in Halford et al.’s
(2016) raising cash and distributing cash regimes.
Third, our paper adds to the previous literature that examines the determinants of
the value of corporate cash holdings, such as corporate financial policy (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006), corporate governance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007), financial constraints
and investment opportunities (Denis and Sibilkov, 2009), firm-specific and time-varying
information asymmetry (Drobetz et al., 2010), corporate diversification (Duchin, 2010;
Tong, 2011), accounting conservatism (Louis et al., 2012), credit rights (Kyro¨la¨inen et al.,
2013), product market competition (Alimov, 2014), refinancing risk (Harford et al., 2014),
the adoption of state-level business combination laws (Fich et al., 2016), internal control
over financial reporting (Gao and Jia, 2016), and cash regimes (Halford et al., 2016).
In this study, we show that firms with greater institutional monitoring attention have a
higher marginal value of cash. Our paper provides new insights into the role of motivated
monitoring institutions in corporate activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our base-
line regression, proxies for institution monitoring motivation, and sample data. Section 3
presents our main test results. Section 4 discusses the analyses we perform to assess the
robustness of our main results. We conclude our paper in section 5. Appendix A provides
the detailed definition of all the variables used in our empirical analyses.
2. Research Design and Sample
2.1. Baseline Regression Model
The objective of this paper is to identify the effect of motivated monitoring institu-
tional investors on the marginal value of corporate cash holdings. Our primary regression
model builds on Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) empirical framework in estimating the
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value of one addition dollar of cash holdings, an approach which has been widely used in
the previous literature (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2009).
Faulkender and Wang (2006) use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to examine the
association between firms’ excess stock returns and unexpected changes in their cash hold-
ings, controlling for other firm-specific characteristics. We extend Faulkender and Wang’s
(2006) model by adding motivated monitoring IO and the interaction of it with unexpected
changes in cash. Our baseline regression model (Model (1)) is described as follows:
ri,t −RBi,t =β0 + β1MMIOi,1,t ×
∆Ci,t
Mi,t−1
+ β2MMIOi,1,t + β3
∆Ci,t
Mi,t−1
+ β4
∆Ei,t
Mi,t−1
+
β5
∆NAi,t
Mi,t−1
+ β6
∆R&Di,t
Mi,t−1
+ β7
∆Ii,t
Mi,t−1
+ β8
∆Di,t
Mi,t−1
+ β9
∆NFi,t
Mi,t−1
+ β10
Ci,t−1
Mi,t−1
+ β11Li,t + i,t
(1)
where i represents a firm and t represents the end of a fiscal year. The dependent variable
ri,t − RBi,t is the annual return on firm i’s stock minus the annual return on one of the
Fama and French (1993) 25 size and book-to-market portfolios to which firm i belongs at
the beginning of year t. ∆ indicates a change in the corresponding variables over year t.
MMIOi,1,t is most motivated monitoring IO which is described in section 1, C is cash and
marketable securities, E is earnings, NA is net assets, R&D is research and development
expenditures, I is interest expenses, D is dividends, NF is net financing proceeds, and
L is leverage. Because both the excess stock returns and firm-specific control variables
are normalized by the market value of equity (M) at the end of the fiscal year t − 1, the
coefficient of our independent variable of interest, β1, can be interpreted as the effect of
most motivated monitoring IO on the marginal value of cash. If institutional monitoring
mitigates the agency problem and leads to a better use of cash, β1 is expected to be positive
– that is, the marginal value of cash increases with the most motivated monitoring IO. The
detailed definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix A.
In our main empirical analyses, we modify our baseline regression Model (1) to ac-
count for other factors that may affect the marginal value of cash. First, Faulkender and
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Wang (2006) find that the marginal value of cash is sensitive to a firm’s cash in hand and
capital structure. We add the interaction terms Ci,t−1×∆Ci,t/Mi,t−1 and Li,t×∆Ci,t/Mi,t−1
to control for these two factors. Second, the marginal value of cash may be associated with
time-varying differences across industries. Therefore, we also control for industry and year
fixed effects. Third, the unexpected change in cash is measured by the difference between
Ci,t and Ci,t−1 in Model (1). The implicit assumption is that the market expected value
of Ci,t is equal to Ci,t−1. Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), we replace ∆Ci,t by
three alternative definitions of the unexpected change in cash. Lastly, Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) document a positive relation between corporate governance and the marginal
value of cash. In Model (1), to differentiate our proxy for institution monitoring attention
with other traditional corporate governance measures, we control for Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith’s (2007) two corporate governance measures: anti-takeover indexes and blockholder
ownership.
2.2. Proxies for Institutional Investor Monitoring Motivation
As discussed in section 1, an institutional investor has a stronger incentive to monitor
a firm that is relatively more important than the other firms held in its portfolio. To mea-
sure the relative importance of a holding firm, we sort all firms in an institutional investor’s
portfolio into decile groups by their descending market value weights in the portfolio. Firms
assigned in decile group 1 (10) have the highest (lowest) weights by market value and there-
fore the most (least) importance to the institutional investor. In our main analyses, we
focus on the ownership of most motivated institutional investors (MMIOi,1), which gen-
erally follows Fich et al.’s (2015) definition of motivated monitoring institutional investors
in M&A targets. Our untabulated results suggest that, on average, firms in decile 1 groups
account for about 41% market value of institutional investors’ overall portfolio holdings. It
is reasonable to assume that institutional monitoring incentives are concentrated on these
firms.
We also use two alternative proxies of most motivated monitoring IO to confirm
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that our results are not driven by the definition of MMIOi,1. The first alternative proxy
is the proportion of the most motivated monitoring institutional investors (PMMIi,1),
defined as the ratio of the number of firm i’s class 1 institutional investors (NMMIi,1)
to the number of all institutional investors holding firm i’s stock. Our second alternative
proxy is the natural log of one plus the number of firm i’s class 1 institutional investors
(Ln(1 +NMMIi,1)).
2.3. Data and Summary Statistics
Our firm-year observations are collected from the CRSP/Compustat Merged dataset.
We restrict our sample to the firms with stock return data from CRSP and annual ac-
counting information from Compustat. To calculate excess stock returns, we obtain the
benchmark break points and benchmark portfolio returns from Kenneth French’s data li-
brary. We collect quarterly institutional investor holding data from Thomson Reuters s34
files. To obtain the classification of institutional investors, we extract data from Brian
Bushee’s personal website. To construct corporate governance indexes, we use data from
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS, formerly RiskMetrics). Our sample period is from
1995 to 2015 because we use firms switching between Russell indexes as our IVs. The
Russell index constituent data are from Bloomberg and available for use starting from
1995. Following the standard sample selection criteria in the value of cash and institu-
tional investor studies (e.g., Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Cella et al., 2013), we exclude firms in financial (SIC between 6000 and 6999) and public
utility (SIC between 4900 and 4999) industries and restrict our sample to firms listed on
the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Similarly to Faulkender and Wang (2006), we delete
firm-year observations with negative net assets, negative equity, or negative dividend. Af-
ter applying these data selection criteria, there are 67, 404 firm-year observations included
in our final sample. We follow the literature and winsorize the accounting and stock return
variables at the 1% and 99% levels. All data are converted to real values in 2016 dollars
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using the consumer price index from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.6
Figure 1 plots the increasing trend of US corporate cash holdings over our sample
period. The total nominal cash holdings increase by 456.6% (from $490.1 billion in 1995 to
$2, 237.6 billion in 2015). The total real cash holdings in 2016 dollars increase by 295.2%
(from $773.9 billion in 1995 to $2284.6 billion in 2015). We also observe a significant
growth in the cash to total asset ratios over our sample period, from 14.7% in 1995 to 22.4
% in 2015. Given the substantial cash holdings of US firms in our sample, the effect of
motivated monitoring institutional investors on the marginal value of cash documented in
our study is of great economic importance.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics on the variables used in our empirical analy-
ses. We observe that the average MMIOj decreases with decreasing institutional monitor-
ing motivation, from 10.6% (MMIO1) to 0.8% (MMIO10). Although most of our sample
period does not overlap the sample period of 1971–2001 in Faulkender and Wang (2006),
the summary statistics of firm-specific variables in these two samples are relatively compa-
rable. The mean and median excess returns of our sample firms are −0.1% and −9%, while
Faulkender and Wang (2006) report a mean (median) of −0.5% (−8.5%). The mean and
median of the independent variables in our sample are: Cash holdings (21.3% and 11.1%),
∆Cash holdings (0.6% and 0.1%), ∆Earnings (1.6% and 0.5%), ∆Net assets (1.7% and
1.4%), ∆R&D (−0.1% and 0.0%), ∆Interest expenses (0.1% and 0.0%), ∆Dividends (0.0%
and 0.0%), Leverage (20.3% and 13.1%), and Net financing (3.6% and 0.1%).
3. Main Results
3.1. Baseline Regression Results
We start our empirical analyses by replicating Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) main
results over their sample period of 1971–2001. Column (1) of Table 2 shows that an
additional dollar of cash is valued by the stock market at 77.2 cents, consistent with
6When we started working on this paper, we had the consumer price index data up to 2016.
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Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) finding of 75.1 cents. After controlling for cash on hand
and leverage, the marginal value of cash in column (2) is $1.07 (= 1.529 + (−0.728 ×
0.184) + (−1.609× 0.203)), which is comparable to $0.94 in Faulkender and Wang (2006).7
The primary objective of our study is to estimate the effect of motivated monitoring
institutional investors on the marginal value of cash holdings. Column (3) of Table 2
presents the results from estimating Model (1) using OLS. Then we extend Model (1) by
controlling for the industry and year fixed effects in column (4) and further include two
interaction terms to control for firms’ cash in hand and capital structure in column (5). In
columns (3)–(5), the coefficients of the independent variable of interest (MMIO1×∆Cash
holdings) are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. Based on
the estimates in column (3), a change of one dollar in cash holdings is associated with an
additional change of 7.6 (= 0.714× 0.106× 100) cents in market value for a firm with an
average motivated monitoring IO. After we add the additional control variables in columns
(4) and (5), the marginal value of cash increases by 8.3 cents and 6.0 cents for a firm with
an average most motivated monitoring IO.8
Next, we examine two alternative measures of most motivated monitoring insti-
tutional investors. In columns (6)–(8), we replace MMIO1 by PMMI1, the number
of the most motivated monitoring institutional investors in a firm divided by the to-
tal number of its institutional investors. In columns (9)–(11), we replace MMIO1 by
Ln(1 +NMMI1), the natural log of one plus the number of the most motivated monitor-
ing institutional investors in a firm. The coefficients of PMMI1 × ∆Cash holdings and
Ln(1 +NMMI1)×∆Cash holdings are all positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The marginal value of cash increases by 13.8 (= 3.949 × 0.035 × 100) cents to 17.6
cents for a firm with an average PMMI1. The marginal value of cash increases by 15.5
7Our replication sample size is slightly larger than Faulkender and Wang’s (2006), for two reasons.
First, Faulkender and Wang (2006) trim their sample variables at the 1% tails, while we winsorize our
variables at the 1% and 99% tails. Second, we use the CRSP/Compustat Merged dataset, which may not
have been available in 2006.
8We also normalize MMIO1 by firm total institutional ownership. Our baseline results are robust to
the normalized measure of most motivated monitoring IO.
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(= 0.146 × 1.059 × 100) cents to 18.9 cents for a firm with an average Ln(1 + NMMI1).
The changes in these three proxies for institutional monitoring attention also have an eco-
nomically significant effect on the marginal value of cash. Columns (5), (8), and (11) imply
that a one standard deviation increase in MMIO1, PMMI1, or Ln(1 +NMMI1) is asso-
ciated with 9.2 (= 0.565× 0.162× 100) cents, 23.7 (= 3.949× 0.060× 100) cents, or 19.9
(= 0.146× 1.361× 100) cents higher marginal value of cash, respectively.9
3.2. Alternative Measures of Expected Change in Cash
According to Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis, stock prices in an informa-
tionally efficient stock market incorporate all the available information about firm future
values. The value of any expected change in cash should have already been incorporated in
stock prices at the beginning of the fiscal year. In Table 2, ∆Cash holdings t, the unexpected
change in cash, is the difference between Cash holdings t and Cash holdings t−1. An implicit
assumption is that the market expected cash holdings at the end of fiscal year t is equal
to the actual cash holdings at the end of fiscal year t− 1. To mitigate the concern about
this implicit assumption, we follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) and use three alternative
measures of expected change in cash. We thus calculate the unexpected change in cash as
the difference between the actual change in cash and the expected change in cash.
Motivated monitoring institutional investors may affect multiple corporate policies,
for example, the investment policy which in turn affects the valuation of cash. In our three
alternative measures of expected change in cash, we directly control for firm size, growth
opportunities, cash flows, capital expenditures, acquisition expenses, investment in net
working capital, leverage, and industry fixed effects. The first alternative measure is the
average change in cash of all firms in one of the Fama–French 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios to which a firm belongs. Given that our dependent variable ri,t−RBi,t is adjusted
for the same benchmark portfolio returns, it is likely that RBi,t should already incorporate
9For brevity, we focus on MMIO1 in the rest of our paper. Our empirical results are robust for PMMI1
and Ln(1 + NMMI1). The economic effects of PMMI1 and Ln(1 + NMMI1) on the marginal value of
cash are more pronounced than those of MMIO1.
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the information on the average change in cash of firms in the corresponding benchmark
portfolio. The first alternative, ∆Alternative cash holdings I, is equal to the difference
between ∆Cash holdings and average ∆Cash holdings for all firms in the benchmark port-
folio. The second and third alternative measures are motivated by Almeida et al. (2004),
who use firms’ cash sources and uses of cash to predict the change in cash holdings. The
expected changes in cash are the predicted values of ∆C in the following two regression
models:
∆Ci,t =β0 + β1Cash flow i,t−1 + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Sizei,t−1 + Industry fixed effects i + i,t (2)
∆Ci,t =β0 + β1Cash flow i,t−1 + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Sizei,t−1 + β4Capital expenditure i,t−1+
β5Acquisitionsi,t−1 + β6∆Net working capital i,t + β7∆Short term debt i,t+
Industry fixed effects i + i,t
(3)
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), all the variables in Models (2) and (3) are nor-
malized by the market value of assets in the fiscal year t − 1. ∆Alternative cash holdings
II and ∆Alternative cash holdings III are the residuals of Models (2) and (3).10
Table 3 reports the results of estimating Model (1) with the three ∆Alternative cash
holdings. All the coefficients of our variable of interest, MMIO1 × ∆Alternative cash
holdings, are positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. Columns (1)–(9)
imply that the marginal value of cash increases by 5.3 cents to 9.0 cents for a firm with
an average MMIO1. A one standard deviation increase in MMIO1 is associated with 8.1
cents to 13.8 cents higher marginal value of cash. The positive effect of the most motivated
monitoring institutional investors on the marginal value of cash remains, both statistically
and economically, significant with respect to three alternative measures of expected change
in cash.
10Please refer to Almeida et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Wang (2006) for the detailed discussions of
these three alternative measures.
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3.3. Traditional Measures of Corporate Governance
One concern with our results is that institutional investors may be attracted to take
large stakes in firms because the firms are seen to have strong governance measures in place.
Therefore, the positive effect of MMIO1 on the marginal value of cash may be mainly
driven by other corporate governance measures. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use
anti-takeover governance indexes and blockholder ownership as two corporate governance
measures. They document a positive relation between firm corporate governance and the
marginal value of cash. To mitigate this concern, we examine whether most motivated
monitoring IO has any positive effect on the marginal value of cash in addition to the
effect of traditional corporate governance proxies. It is worth noting that our effective
sample size is substantially reduced by requiring firm-year observations with corporate
governance index data.
Table 4 reports the results from estimating Model (1) by controlling for corporate gov-
ernance indexes and alternative institutional ownership simultaneously. In columns (1)–(3),
the corporate governance index is the G-index developed by Gompers et al. (2003)11, the
alternative institutional ownership proxies are total institutional ownership (TIO), block-
holder ownership (Block1), and blockholder ownership tercile indicator variable (Block2),
respectively. In columns (4)–(6), we repeat our analyses in columns (1)–(3) but replace
the G-index by the E-index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009)12.
Columns (1)–(6) of Table 4 show that the coefficients for the interaction termMMIO1
×∆Cash holdings are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level, which
is consistent with the evidence in Table 2. After controlling for the corporate governance
indexes and other institutional ownership measures simultaneously, the marginal value of
cash increases from 10.6 cents to 22.1 cents for a firm with an average MMIO1. A one
11Because the ISS stops reporting the G-index values after 2007, we follow Li and Li (2016) and extrap-
olate firms’ G-index values after 2007, from their last available G-index values in the ISS.
12The entrenchment index, E-index, is composed of six anti-takeover provisions: staggered board, limits
to shareholder bylaw amendments, limitations on amending the charter, poison pills, golden parachutes,
and supermajority requirements to approve mergers and charter amendments (Bebchuk et al., 2009).
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standard deviation increase in MMIO1 is associated with 16.2 cents to 33.7 cents higher
marginal value of cash. Therefore, the positive effect of the most motivated monitoring
institutional investors on the marginal value of cash remains robust, after controlling for
the managerial entrenchment and other institutional ownership measures. In columns (1)–
(5), the coefficients of the interactions between ∆Cash holdings and corporate governance
indexes are negative and statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level, which is consistent
with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith’s (2007) finding that better firm corporate governance is as-
sociated with a higher marginal value of cash. Fich et al. (2015) identify that the motivated
monitoring IO of M&A targets is positively related to the deal completion probability, the
likelihood of bid revision, and the deal premium, while the proxies of traditional institu-
tional ownership in targets are not related to these deal outcomes. Consistent with Fich
et al. (2015), we find that the coefficients of the interactions between ∆Cash holdings and
traditional institutional ownership measures are not significantly positive, suggesting that
the motivation of institutional monitoring is more likely related to the relative importance
of a firm to institutional investors.
The analyses in Table 4 are based on a smaller sample than our main sample. We
require firms to have anti-takeover provision data in the ISS and discard the observations
with middle terciles of blockholder ownership in columns (3) and (6). Therefore, we re-
main cautious about over-interpreting and generalizing these results. However, the positive
relation between the most motivated monitoring institutional investors and the marginal
value of cash is even stronger in our restricted samples and after controlling for the gover-
nance indexes and traditional institutional ownership proxies. In our untabulated results,
we find that the pairwise correlation between MMIO1 and TIO is 0.38 and statistically
significant, indicating that MMIO1 and TIO are not highly correlated. In contrast, the
pairwise correlation between MMIO1 and Block1 is −0.02 and statistically significant and
the pairwise correlation between MMIO1 and G-index (E-index ) is 0.12 (0.03) and sta-
tistically significant, suggesting that our motivated monitoring IO measure captures firm
governance which may not be explained by these traditional corporate governance proxies.
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3.4. Motivated Monitoring Institutional Investor Types
It is possible that different types of institutional investors may have different incen-
tives to monitor the firms in their portfolios. To ensure that the positive effect of the most
motivated monitoring institutional investors on the marginal value of cash is not driven
by a specific type of institution, we refine MMIO1 by institution type and rerun Model
(1). We adopt two popular classifications in the institutional investor literature. First,
following Brickley et al. (1988), Almazan et al. (2005), and Chen et al. (2007), we divide
MMIO1 into MMIO1,Independent and MMIO1,Grey , according to the institutional investors’
potential business ties with the invested firm. Independent institutional investors include
independent investment advisors, investment companies, and public pension funds. Grey
institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, private pension funds, univer-
sity endowments, and foundations.13 Second, we adopt Bushee (1998)’s classification and
divide MMIO1 into MMIO1,Transient , MMIO1,Quasi-indexer , and MMIO1,Dedicated .
We replace MMIO1 by the refined motivated monitoring IO in Model (1) and report
the regression results in Table 5. The coefficients for the interaction MMIO1,IOType ×
∆Cash holdings are positive and statistically significant in columns (1)–(4). In the order
of independent, grey, transient, and quasi-indexer, the marginal value of cash increases
by 6.0 cents, 4.0 cents, 5.1 cents, and 4.0 cents, respectively, for a firm with an aver-
age MMIO1,IOType. A one standard deviation increase in these four MMIO1,IOType is
associated with 7.3 cents to 10.3 cents higher marginal value of cash. The coefficient of
MMIO1,Dedicated ×∆Cash holdings is positive but not statistically significant at the 10%
level. One possible explanation for this statistical insignificance is that the number of ded-
icated institutions is much less than the number of transient and quasi-indexer institutions
according to Bushee’s (1998) classification. Our results suggest that the positive effect
of institutional investors’ monitoring motivation on the marginal value of cash does not
concentrate on a certain type of institution. Even grey and transient institutions, which
13After 1998, the institution type classification is not accurate in the Thomson Reuters s34 files. We
follow Brian Bushee’s institution type classification for institutional investors after 1998.
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are commonly believed to be less active monitors, have a positive role in monitoring the
firms that are important to them.
3.5. Institutional Ownership by Ten Decile Monitoring Motiva-
tion
In the previous analyses, we measured most motivated monitoring IO by MMIO1,
the ownership of institutional investors whose holding value in a firm was within the top
decile stock group in their portfolios. We followed Fich et al. (2015) and chose the top decile
in our definition. However, there is no reason to assume that institutional investors lack
motivation to monitor firms in the rest of the nine decile groups. To examine the relation
between institutional investors with different monitoring motivations and the marginal
value of cash, we rerun Model (1) by interacting ∆Cash holdings with all ten decile MMIOj
individually. We expect that the monitoring motivation of institutional investors should
decrease gradually from MMIO1 to MMIO10, where MMIO10 represents the ownership
of institutional investors with the least monitoring motivation.
We report the results of ten decile MMIOj in Table 6. The coefficients of the in-
teractions between ∆Cash holdings and MMIO1–MMIO2 are positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level, indicating that institutional investors may have a high motiva-
tion to monitor the cash holdings of firms in the top two deciles of their portfolios. For
MMIO3–MMIO5, the effect of these IO measures on the marginal value of cash becomes
statistically insignificant. On the other side, the coefficients of the interactions between
∆Cash holdings and MMIO6–MMIO10 are negative and statistically significant at the
1% or 5% level, suggesting that institutional investors may lack the motivation to mon-
itor the cash holdings of a firm in the bottom five decile groups of their portfolios. We
plot the value effect of an average MMIOj on the marginal value of cash and the 95%
confidence intervals of the effect in Figure 2. The value effect of an average MMIOj on
the marginal value of cash varies from positive 8.3 cents (MMIO1) to negative 4.9 cents
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(MMIO8). We observe an obvious decreasing trend for the value effect from MMIO1
to MMIO10. Combined, the results in Tables 2–6 support our prediction that motivated
monitoring institutional investors increase the marginal value of corporate cash holdings
and institutional investors do not allocate their monitoring attention evenly to every stock
in their portfolios.
4. Robustness Tests and Further Discussions
In this section, we conduct a battery of robustness tests and discuss the effect of most
motivated institutional investors on firms’ accounting performance through monitoring
their cash holdings.
4.1. Endogeneity of Motivated Monitoring Institutional Owner-
ship
The previous literature on the relation between institutional investors and corporate
activities has long recognized the difficulty of disentangling the effect of institutional in-
vestor monitoring and other unobserved firm characteristics. A similar challenge in our
study is to ensure that we identify the effect of motivated monitoring institutional investors
on the marginal value of cash and not the effect of confounding variables. It is possible that
institutional investors have private information on their holding firms and choose to invest
more in those with a higher marginal value of cash. To address this potential endogeneity
issue due to the unobserved confounding variables and investors’ self-selection, we adopt
the following three identifications: 2SLS, high-dimensional fixed effects, and the change in
most motivated monitoring IO.
4.1.1. Two-stage least squares
Following recent studies on firm switching between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes,
we adopt an IV approach similar to Fich et al. (2015), Crane et al. (2016), and Schmidt and
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Fahlenbrach (2016). Russell Investments reconstitute the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes
in June every year. In terms of the market capitalization, the largest 1, 000 firms are
included in the Russell 1000 index and the subsequent 2, 000 firms are included in the
Russell 2000 index.14 When firm stocks switch between the two Russell indexes or are
newly added in the indexes, the index tracking institutional ownership of these stocks will
change exogenously. The portfolio adjustment of index tracking funds will also pose an
exogenous shock on firm stocks that are not affected by the Russell index reconstitution.
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, we choose the Russell switch indicator variables in year
t− 1 as our IVs so that firm excess returns over year t are not correlated with these IVs.
In the first stage of our analysis, we estimate the following regression:
MMIOi,1,t =β0 + β1R1TR2i,t−1 + β2R2TR1i,t−1 + β3R2TNi,t−1 + β4NTR2i,t−1
+B ∗ Control variables i,t + i,t
(4)
where R1TR2i,t (R2TR1i,t) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i switches from
the Russell 1000 (2000) index to the Russell 2000 (1000) index in year t, and R2TNi,t
(NTR2i,t) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i enters (leaves) the Russell 2000
index. The predicted MMIO1 from Model (4) enters as an explanatory variable into our
second stage regression of Model (1). The control variables in Model (4) are the same as
those included in Model (1).15
In Panel A of Table 7, we replicate our main results from Table 2 using the Russell
index reconstitution as IVs for most motivated monitoring IO. Columns (1)–(3) report the
results of the first stage regressions. The coefficients of IVs are statistically significant
in the first stage regression, suggesting that our Russell index switch indicators satisfy
the relevance condition as IVs. The results reported in columns (4)–(6) show that the
coefficients of the interaction terms between the predicted motivated monitoring IO and
14Please refer to www.ftserussell.com/research-insights/russell-reconstitution for the detailed explana-
tions of the Russell index reconstitution.
15In our untabulated tests, we follow Appel et al. (2016a) and add ln(firm market capitalization) and
(ln(firm market capitalization))2 as the control variables in our 2SLS regressions. Firm market capitaliza-
tions are measured at the end of May. Our results remain qualitatively the same.
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∆Cash holdings remain positive and statistically significant. In further robustness tests, we
replicate our results from Table 3 using the IV identification and report the results in Panel
B of Table 7. The effect of predicted most motivated monitoring IO on the marginal value
of cash remains positive and statistically significant across three alternative definitions of
the expected change in cash holdings.
4.1.2. High-dimensional fixed effects
The potential endogeneity associated with motivated monitoring institutional in-
vestors may be due to unobserved firm characteristics affecting both institutional investor
monitoring motivation and the value of corporate cash holdings. Previous studies have
documented many factors related to the value of corporate cash holdings.16 However, it is
practically implausible to control for all of them in our empirical studies. We adopt the
identification from Gormley and Matsa (2014) and use high-dimensional fixed effects to
indirectly control for any unobserved or omitted firm characteristics. In columns (1) and
(2) of Table 8, we estimate Model (1) and its extension by controlling for the firm and
year fixed effects. In columns (3) and (4), we rerun these two regressions by controlling
for the triple fixed effects of Firm × Year × Fama–French 48 industry. All the coefficients
of MMIO1 × ∆Cash holdings are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
The marginal value of cash increases by 3.9 cents to 4.6 cents for a firm with an average
MMIO1. A one standard deviation increase in MMIO1 is associated with 6.0 cents to 7.0
cents higher marginal value of cash. The positive effect of most motivated monitoring IO
on the marginal value of cash remains both statistically and economically significant after
controlling for unobserved firm characteristics.
4.1.3. Change in motivated monitoring institutional ownership
We use the level of IO as our main explanatory variable in the previous analyses.
To further address the endogeneity due to the reverse causality concern that institutional
16We have reviewed some of them at the end of Section 1.
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investors choose to invest more in firms with a higher marginal value of cash, we conduct a
semi-difference-in-difference test in which we replace MMIO1 in Model (1) by the change
in MMIO1 from March to September year t (∆
′MMIO1). ∆′MMIO1 may extract the
impact of the changes in most motivated monitoring IO on the marginal value of cash.
Our test results are reported in Table 9. The coefficients of ∆′MMIO1 ×∆Cash holdings
are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the increase in
most motivated monitoring IO is positively related to the marginal value of cash. A one
standard deviation increase in ∆′MMIO1 (0.07) is associated with 10.1 cents to 11.4 cents
increase in the marginal value of cash.
4.2. Monitoring Motivation-weighted Institutional Ownership
In section 3.5, we divide a firm’s IO into ten groups and document a decreasing
trend for the value effects of these ten MMIOs on corporate cash holdings, from MMIO1
to MMIO10. Based on these findings, we construct a measure of general monitoring
motivation-weighted IO, TMA (total monitoring attention), which includes all the owner-
ship of a firm’s institutional investors:
TMAi = ln(1 +
N∑
j=1
ωi,j ∗ IOi,j ∗ 10, 000) (5)
where N is the total number of institutions investing in firm i, ωi,j is the market value
weight of firm i’s stock in institution j’s portfolio, and IOi,j is the ownership of institution
j in firm i. Because institutions’ monitoring attention to a firm is positively related to the
relative importance of the firm’s stock in their portfolios, ωi,j may represent institution j’s
motivation to monitor firm i. IOi,j may represent the monitoring effectiveness of institution
j in firm i. As the measure of general monitoring motivation-weighted IO, TMAi takes
account of both institutional investors’ monitoring motivation and their voting power in
firm i. We examine the effect of TMA on the marginal value of cash in Table 10. Columns
(1)–(2) report the OLS regression results and columns (3)–(4) report the results of the
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second stage regression in our 2SLS regressions. The coefficients of TMA×∆Cash holdings
and IV TMA×∆Cash holdings are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level,
suggesting that firms with a greater TMA attract a higher aggregated institutional investor
monitoring attention. Column (2) indicates that the marginal value of cash increases by
10.1 cents for a firm with an average TMA and that a one standard deviation increase in
TMA is associated with 6.4 cents increase in the marginal value of cash.
4.3. Institutional Monitoring Across Three Cash Regimes
Faulkender and Wang (2006) use firms’ interest coverage and industry market-to-book
ratio to classify three cash regimes: raising cash, distributing cash, and servicing debt.17
Across these three ex ante classified cash regimes, the value of one additional dollar cash
varies considerably, with the highest value $1.16 in the raising cash regime and the lowest
value $0.45 in the servicing debt regime. Our untabulated results show that MMIO1 has
a positive effect on the marginal value of cash across the three cash regimes defined by
Faulkender and Wang (2006).
Halford et al. (2016) assume that stock prices can unbiasedly incorporate firms’ ac-
tions in the future and use an ex post classification to group firms into the following three
cash regimes. First, firms that issue equity and do not pay dividends in fiscal year t are
within the raising cash regime in that year. Second, firms that distribute cash to share-
holders and do not issue equity in fiscal year t are within the distributing cash regime
in that year. Third, firms that have their market leverage ratios in the top decile distri-
bution of firms in the beginning of fiscal year t, and do not raise or distribute cash over
that year, are within the servicing debt regime in that year.18 More importantly, Halford
et al. (2016) find that the two corporate governance measures examined in Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007) do not have a significant effect on the marginal value of cash in any of
17Interest coverage is defined as the sum of cash holdings and earnings in the beginning of fiscal year t
divided by the interest expense over the same year.
18A firm may be classified into different cash regimes according to the classifications of Faulkender and
Wang (2006) and Halford et al. (2016). It is not our paper’s objective to compare these two classifications.
We only check if our main results are robust to different cash regime classifications.
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these three cash regimes. We replicate our Model (1) with the IV identification in Halford
et al.’s (2016) three cash regimes and report the results in Table 11. In the raising cash
and distributing cash regimes, the coefficients of MMIO1 × ∆Cash holdings are positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In the servicing debt regime, the coefficient of
MMIO1 ×∆Cash holdings is positive but not statistically significant at the 10% level.
As argued in Halford et al. (2016), “the foundational theory is silent as to the regimes
in which corporate governance should affect the marginal value of cash”. Our empirical
results suggest that stronger motivated monitoring IO is associated with a higher marginal
value of cash for firms that are in the raising cash regime and distributing cash regime.
For firms in the servicing debt regime, it is possible that debtholders have the main claims
on the cash holdings and, therefore, equity holders may have less motivation to monitor
these firms.
4.4. Monitoring and Firm Operating Performance
So far, our results show that motivated monitoring IO is positively related to the stock
market valuation of corporate cash holding. It remains unknown whether firms actually
benefit from the increase in the value of their cash holdings. For example, the marginal
value of cash is higher for firms that are more financially constrained. In order to show that
the increase in the marginal value of cash is actually the result of good corporate policy, we
study the real outcomes of monitoring by motivated institutional investors. Cash is a firm’s
most liquid asset, subject to the highest level of managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986). If
institutional investors inhibit the agency cost of managerial discretion, we would expect to
observe a positive relation between firms’ cash holdings and operating performance when
motivated monitoring IO is high.
We examine four Fama–French 48 industry-adjusted operating performance measures
studied in Kim et al. (2014): return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin, and
asset turnover. To address the endogeneity between most motivated monitoring IO and
firm operating performance, we use the IV approach discussed in section 4.1.1. Table 12
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reports the estimation results. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficients of the
interaction between predicted MMIO1 and cash holdings are all positive and statistically
significant in the second stage regressions.
4.5. Motivated Monitoring Institutional Ownership and Firm
Size
For firms with larger market capitalization, it is more likely that their market value
weights are ranked at the top of an institution’s portfolio. One alternative explanation
of our main results is that most motivated monitoring IO is positively associated with
firm size. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that institutional investors invest more in
large firms and therefore stock returns are positively related to firm size. As a result, the
positive effect of most motivated monitoring IO on the marginal value of cash documented
in our paper may only indicate that cash is more valuable in larger firms. The correlation
between MMIO1 and firm size is 0.63 in our sample. We do not directly control for firm
size as an independent variable in Model (1), because the dependent variable is annual firm
returns, adjusted by Fama–French 25 size and book-to-market portfolio returns. In our
untabulated tests, we add Size and Size×∆Cash holdings as control variables in Model
(1) and the coefficient of MMIO1 × ∆Cash holdings remains positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of Size is not statistically significant at the 10%
level and the coefficient of Size ×∆Cash holdings is negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level. Our results, reported in Table 6, are also robust after controlling for Size
and Size ×∆Cash holdings. These results suggest that the positive effect of MMIO1 on
the marginal value of cash does not arise solely from the firm size effect.
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4.6. Motivated Monitoring Institutional Investors and the Value
of Excess Cash
In our previous empirical analyses, we adopt Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) specifi-
cation and estimate the change in firm market value associated with a change of one dollar
in cash holdings. Several previous studies on the value of cash employ another framework,
initiated by Fama and French (1998), and estimate the value of firm excess cash based
on a price-level regression (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kyro¨la¨inen et al., 2013;
Gao and Jia, 2016). Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) argue that excess cash might be
more relevant to the agency problem than cash holdings.19 The dependent variable in the
price-level regression is the market value of assets, normalized by the book value of net
assets, similar to the market-to-book ratio. We use the IV approach discussed in section
4.1.1 to estimate the predicted most motivated monitoring IO because the market-to-book
ratio is a standard proxy for firm growth opportunities and might be endogenously cor-
related with IO. Then we add both the predicted most motivated monitoring IO and the
interaction term of it and excess cash in the price-level regression. Our untabulated results,
based on the price-level regression, are consistent with our main results. Greater motivated
monitoring IO is associated with a higher value of excess cash.
4.7. Changes in US Public Firms Over Time
It is well known that the US stock market has become more institutionalized during
the last 40 years (Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Zeng, 2016). Over the same time period,
US public firms also experienced substantial changes in terms of their firm policies and
characteristics. Kahle and Stulz (2017) find that there are fewer US public firms and on
average they are older, less profitable, invest more in R&D, hold more intangible assets and
cash, and have more payouts to shareholders. Furthermore, Bates et al. (2017) document
a positive time trend in the value of corporate cash holdings from 1980 to 2009. Given
19Please refer to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) for the detailed discussion of the price-level regression.
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these two recent studies, one potential concern is that we observe the positive relation
between motivated monitoring IO and the marginal value of cash because both have a
positive time trend over our sample period. It is also possible that the positive relation
we document is affected by the changes in firm policies and characteristics over time. In
our empirical analyses, we have controlled for the year fixed effects and established the
causality by documenting that the changes in motivated monitoring IO lead to an increase
in the marginal value of cash. In this section, we examine whether our main results are
robust to the changes in US public firms.
To allow for a more nuanced interpretation of the coefficients, we conduct sub-sample
analyses and report the results in Table 13. We employ the same 2SLS regression model as
the one used in Panel A of Table 7. For brevity, we only report the second stage regression
results. We first examine whether the positive relation between motivated monitoring IO
and the marginal value of cash varies over time. We split our sample into 1995–2004
and 2005–2015. Columns (1)–(2) show that motivated monitoring IO has a significantly
positive effect on the marginal value of cash over both time periods. Different from our
results, Bates et al. (2017) find that institutional block holdings only have a significantly
positive effect on the marginal value of cash in the 1990s, but not in the 1980s or the 2000s.
This difference further supports the importance of considering the monitoring motivation
of institutional investors in the future corporate governance studies.
Next, we divide our sample into two sub-samples based on the medians of firm poli-
cies and characteristics that have gradually changed over time according to Kahle and
Stulz (2017): cash holdings, firm age, R&D expenses, intangible assets, and profitability.20
The high (low) sub-samples include firm-years with above(below)-annual-median firm-level
variables. Columns (3)–(12) of Table 13 represent the results of our sub-sample analyses.
The estimated coefficients of IVMIO1×∆Cash holdings remain positive and statistically
significant over both sub-samples for all five firm policies/characteristics. Because we find
20Kahle and Stulz (2017) also indicate that US firms pay out more to shareholders. In Section 4.3, we
have shown that motivated monitoring IO has a positive effect on the marginal value of cash when firms
are in the distributing cash regime.
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robust evidence that motivated monitoring IO is positively associated with the marginal
value of cash in both high and low sub-samples, it is unlikely that our main result is driven
by the changes in firms over our sample period.
Overall, our findings indicate that the positive impact of motivated monitoring IO on
the marginal value of cash is persistent over time and robust after taking into consideration
of the changes in US public firms.
5. Conclusions
Firms may hold cash because they are uncertain about their immediate future envi-
ronment, or because they want to retain the flexibility to exploit investment opportunities
that may arise unexpectedly. The retention of cash might therefore be expected to be
valued positively if investors were confident in the firms’ managers. However, cash reserves
offer managers the scope to exploit their agency position and might, therefore, be value
reducing when seen by sceptical investors. In curbing agency discretion, investors need to
monitor managerial decisions and, therefore, it is natural to examine those investors who
have the greatest motivation to carry out the monitoring activities. Institutional investors,
because of the size of their holdings, are likely to be willing to spend time and resources in
monitoring the actions of boards controlling the firms in which they hold stock. However,
institutions’ monitoring attention is in limited supply and, therefore, it seems reasonable
that even large institutional investors will allocate their monitoring activities to those firms
in which they invest most of their money.
In this paper, we follow Fich et al. (2015) to identify the motivated monitoring in-
stitutional investors and have analyzed motivated monitors using the marginal value of
corporate cash holdings as an empirical setting. Clearly the market impounds the past
and expected cash holdings in observed prices, so the task is to examine the stock price
reactions to unexpected changes in cash holdings. For those firms in which there is greater
motivated monitoring institutional ownership, the marginal value of cash is indeed found
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to be higher – thereby lending support to the argument that institutional investors con-
tribute to the efficiency of corporate governance through their monitoring activities. This
is further strengthened by the finding that the accounting-based performance measures are
also positively related to the institution monitoring firm’s cash holdings. We also find that
the changes in valuation we ascribe to the investors identified as having the strongest moti-
vation to monitor, are not subsumed in other suggested indicators of corporate governance
such as: total institutional ownership, blockholdings, or corporate governance indexes.
The effect we find is not restricted to any specific type of institutions and our findings
remain robust to including other alternative explanatory variables. Our classifications of
institution monitoring motivation provide a rational direction of positive valuation effects
– investors who hold less important stakes in firms do not appear to be associated with
the increased valuations that are found in firms with more motivated investors.
The general conclusion of our findings is that institutional investors’ monitoring at-
tention concentrates on the firms whose market value weights are among the top of their
portfolios. Motivated monitoring institutional investors appear to perform a valuable role
through their monitoring activities in ensuring that corporate cash holdings are not wasted
and managerial decisions are, thereby, more appropriately aligned with shareholders’ in-
terests.
Highlights
• Institutions do not evenly distribute their monitoring attention to their holding firms.
• Institutions’ monitoring attention to a firm drops with the firm’s weight in their
portfolios.
• Marginal value of cash is positively related to motivated monitoring institutional
ownership.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Variable definitions
This table provides variable definitions and corresponding data sources. CRSP refers to the
Centre for Research in Security Prices, ISS refers to the Institutional Shareholder Services
(formerly RiskMetrics), s34 files refer to the Thomson Reuters 13F Database, Bushee’s web-
site refers to http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html, and FF refers to
Kenneth French’s website http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data
library.html#Benchmarks.
Variable Definition Source
MMIO1–MMIO10 MMIOi is the ownership of institutional investors whose
holding value in a firm is within the range of the top
10(i− 1)% and 10i% portfolio stock holdings in September
of year t (Fich et al., 2015).
s34 files
PMMI1 Ratio of the number of most motivated monitoring
investors to the total number of institutional investors
(Fich et al., 2015).
s34 files
NMMI1 Number of the most motivated monitoring institutional
investors (Fich et al., 2015).
s34 files
TIO Total institutional ownership. s34 files
MMIO1,Independent Ownership of most motivated monitoring investors who
are classified as independent ones (Chen et al., 2007).
s34 files &
Bushee’s website
MMIO1,Grey Ownership of most motivated monitoring investors who
are classified as grey ones (Chen et al., 2007).
s34 files &
Bushee’s website
MMIO1,Transient Ownership of most motivated monitoring investors who
are classified as transient ones (Bushee, 2001).
s34 files &
Bushee’s website
MMIO1,Quasi-indexer Ownership of most motivated monitoring investors who
are classified as quasi-indexer ones (Bushee, 2001).
s34 files &
Bushee’s website
MMIO1,Dedicated Ownership of most motivated monitoring investors who
are classified as dedicated ones (Bushee, 2001).
s34 files &
Bushee’s website
∆′MMIO1 Change in MMIO1 from March to September of year t
(Fich et al., 2015).
s34 files
TMA Monitoring motivation-weighted institutional ownership. s34 files
ri −RBi Excess stock returns with the benchmark portfolios defined
as Fama–French 25 portfolios formed on size and
book-to-market (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
CRSP,
Compustat, and
FF
MV Market value of equity, defined as the number of shares
outstanding (CSHPRI) multiplied by stock price
(PRCC F) (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Cash holdings Cash plus marketable securities (CHE) normalized by MV
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
∆Cash holdings Change in cash holdings from fiscal year t− 1 to year t,
normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t (Faulkender
and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
∆Earnings Change in earnings from fiscal year t− 1 to year t,
normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t. Earnings
are calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (IB)
plus interest (XINT), deferred tax credits (TXDI), and
investment tax credits (ITCI) (Faulkender and Wang,
2006).
Compustat
∆Net assets Change in net assets from fiscal year t− 1 to year t,
normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t. Net assets
are calculated as total assets (AT) minus cash holdings
(CHE) (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
∆R&D Change in R&D expenditure (XRD) from fiscal year t− 1
to year t, normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
∆Interest expenses Change in interest expenses (XINT) from fiscal year t− 1
to year t, normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
∆Dividends Change in total common share dividends (DVC) from
fiscal year t− 1 to year t, normalized by MV at the start
of fiscal year t (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Leverage Calculated as total debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by the
sum of total debt and MV (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Net financing Net financing proceeds are defined as equity issuance
(SSTK) minus repurchases (PRSTKC), plus debt issuance
(DLTIS) minus debt redemption (DLTR) (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006).
Compustat
R1TR2 Indicator takes one when firms switch from the Russell
1000 to the Russell 2000 index due to the relative decrease
in market value, zero otherwise (Fich et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
R2TR1 Indicator takes one when firms switch from the Russell
2000 to the Russell 1000 index due to the relative increase
in market value, zero otherwise (Fich et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
R2TN Indicator takes one when firms drop out of the Russell
2000 index due to the relative decrease in market value,
zero otherwise (Fich et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
NTR2 Indicator takes one when firms are newly added into the
Russell 2000 index due to the relative increase in market
value, zero otherwise (Fich et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
Continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
ROA Fama–French 48 industry-adjusted return on asset,
calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB)
divided by average book value of assets (AT) between
fiscal year t and t− 1 (Kim et al., 2014).
Compustat
ROE Fama–French 48 industry-adjusted return on equity,
calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) net
of preferred stock dividend (DVP) divided by average book
value of equity (CEQ) between fiscal year t and t− 1 (Kim
et al., 2014).
Compustat
Nmargin Fama–French 48 industry-adjusted net profit margin,
calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB)
divided by net sales (SALE) (Kim et al., 2014).
Compustat
AssetTO Fama–French 48 industry adjusted asset turnover,
calculated as net sales (SALE) divided by average book
value of assets (AT) (Kim et al., 2014).
Compustat
Cash/Total assets Cash plus marketable securities (CHE) normalized by total
assets (AT).
Compustat
Age Firm age, calculated as Ln(1+Number of years since the
first time the firm appeared in Compustat) (Kim et al.,
2014).
Compustat
Size Firm size, calculated as Ln(book value of asset (AT))
(Kim et al., 2014).
Compustat
MTB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of assets
(MV+total debt) divided by book value of assets (AT)
(Kim et al., 2014).
Compustat
Tangibility Asset tangibility, calculated as property plant and
equipment (PPENT) divided by total assets (AT) (Kim
et al., 2014).
Compustat
Capital expenditure Capital expenditure (CAPEX) normalized by total assets
(AT).
Compustat
G-index Corporate governance index composed of twenty-four
provisions on investor rights and takeover protections
applied to the company (Gompers et al., 2003).
ISS
E-index Entrenchment index composed of the six most important
provisions in G-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009).
ISS
Block1 Aggregate ownership of all institutional investors whose
ownership exceeds 5% of common shares outstanding of a
firm.
s34 files
Block2 Blockholder ownership indicator variable which is equal to
1 if a firm is among the top tercile blockholder ownership
distribution and zero if a firm is among the bottom tercile
blockholder ownership distribution (Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith, 2007).
s34 files
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Figure 1. US corporate cash holdings
This figure plots the total cash holdings and cash to total assets ratios of US firms in our
sample, which consists of all non-financial and non-utility firm-year observations for the
period 1995–2015. All firms are covered by the CRSP/Compustat Merged dataset and
listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. The bar charts represent total cash holdings, the
sum of cash and marketable securities, in nominal and real terms. The line plot represents
the ratios of total cash holdings to total assets.
Figure 2. The economic effect of average MMIOj on the marginal value of cash
This figure plots the economic effect of MMIOj on the marginal value of cash, for j
from 1 to 10. The solid line plot represents the economic effect of an average MMIOj
on the marginal value of cash. The dashed lines and the shaded area represent the 95%
confidence intervals of the economic effect. This figure is based on the estimated coefficients
of MMIOj ×∆Cash holdings reported in Table 6.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of all variables used in our empirical tests. The
sample consists of 67, 404 firm-year observations of US firms over the sample period 1995–
2015 with required data for our regressions. The number of observations, mean, standard
deviation, minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and maximum are reported
from left to right, in sequence for each variable. Detailed definitions of all variables are
described in Appendix A.
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min p25 Median p75 Max
MMIO1 67,404 0.106 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.155 1.000
MMIO2 67,404 0.086 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.141 0.997
MMIO3 67,404 0.071 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.112 0.996
MMIO4 67,404 0.058 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.087 0.970
MMIO5 67,404 0.047 0.061 0.000 0.001 0.026 0.068 0.996
MMIO6 67,404 0.038 0.051 0.000 0.003 0.020 0.053 0.994
MMIO7 67,404 0.029 0.041 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.038 0.944
MMIO8 67,404 0.021 0.033 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.026 0.933
MMIO9 67,404 0.014 0.025 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.017 0.977
MMIO10 67,404 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.796
PMMI1 67,404 0.035 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.046 1.000
NMMI1 67,404 11.519 45.548 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.000 1100.000
Ln(1 +NMMI1) 67,404 1.059 1.361 0.000 0.000 0.693 1.792 6.965
TIO 67,404 0.476 0.305 0.000 0.193 0.490 0.739 1.000
MMIO1,Independent 67,404 0.078 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.120 1.000
MMIO1,Grey 67,404 0.028 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.993
MMIO1,Transient 67,404 0.027 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.995
MMIO1,Quasi-indexer 67,404 0.065 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.998
MMIO1,Dedicated 67,404 0.012 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
∆′MMIO1 67,404 -0.001 0.070 -0.980 -0.007 0.000 0.006 1.000
TMA 67,404 2.590 1.638 0.000 1.170 2.889 3.816 9.086
ri −RBi 67,404 -0.001 0.600 -1.021 -0.355 -0.090 0.204 2.631
Cash holdingst−1 67,404 0.184 0.242 0.001 0.035 0.100 0.231 1.425
∆Cash holdings 67,404 0.006 0.137 -0.503 -0.032 0.001 0.036 0.633
∆Earnings 67,404 0.016 0.216 -0.765 -0.031 0.005 0.040 1.102
∆Net assets 67,404 0.017 0.418 -2.167 -0.061 0.014 0.104 1.810
∆R&D 67,404 -0.001 0.021 -0.111 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.074
∆Interest expenses 67,404 0.001 0.022 -0.134 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.115
∆Dividends 67,404 0.000 0.009 -0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038
Leverage 67,404 0.203 0.223 0.000 0.009 0.131 0.321 0.883
Net financing 67,404 0.036 0.214 -0.715 -0.031 0.001 0.053 1.160
R1TR2 67,404 0.011 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
R2TR1 67,404 0.013 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
R2TN 67,404 0.031 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
NTR2 67,404 0.032 0.176 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Cash/Total assets 67,404 0.190 0.213 0.000 0.030 0.105 0.279 0.871
ROA 67,404 -0.015 0.187 -0.846 -0.033 0.035 0.079 0.256
ROE 67,404 -0.032 0.399 -1.960 -0.071 0.074 0.159 0.615
Nmargin 67,404 -0.237 1.299 -9.320 -0.028 0.030 0.078 0.351
AssetTO 67,404 1.119 0.802 0.000 0.569 0.963 1.462 4.700
Age 67,404 2.592 0.742 0.000 1.946 2.565 3.178 4.190
Size 67,404 5.857 2.132 0.849 4.275 5.741 7.330 10.797
MTB 67,404 1.662 1.463 0.285 0.813 1.187 1.910 9.160
Tangibility 67,404 0.273 0.236 0.000 0.086 0.196 0.400 0.997
Capital expenditure 67,404 0.056 0.061 0.000 0.018 0.036 0.070 0.361
G-index 17,341 8.998 2.678 2.000 7.000 9.000 11.000 17.000
E-index 16,973 2.795 1.353 0.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 6.000
Block1 67,404 0.168 0.162 0.000 0.051 0.136 0.256 1.000
38
T
a
b
le
2
.
M
o
st
m
o
ti
v
a
te
d
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
a
n
d
th
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
v
a
lu
e
o
f
ca
sh
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
fi
rm
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
ch
an
ge
s
in
ca
sh
h
ol
d
in
gs
,
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
m
os
t
m
ot
iv
at
ed
m
on
it
or
in
g
IO
,
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
of
th
e
p
ri
or
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s,
an
d
co
n
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
of
67
,4
04
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
of
U
S
fi
rm
s
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
19
95
–2
01
5
w
it
h
re
q
u
ir
ed
d
at
a
fo
r
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
r i
t
−
R
B it
,
th
e
an
n
u
al
ex
ce
ss
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
F
am
a
an
d
F
re
n
ch
(1
99
3)
25
si
ze
an
d
b
o
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
p
or
tf
ol
io
s.
∆
in
d
ic
at
es
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
va
ri
ab
le
s
fr
om
ye
ar
t
−
1
to
t.
C
ol
u
m
n
s
(1
)–
(2
)
re
p
li
ca
te
F
au
lk
en
d
er
an
d
W
an
g’
s
(2
00
6)
b
as
el
in
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ov
er
th
ei
r
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
of
19
71
–2
00
1.
T
h
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
m
ot
iv
at
ed
m
on
it
or
in
g
IO
ar
e
M
M
I
O
1
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(3
)–
(5
),
P
M
M
I 1
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(6
)–
(8
),
an
d
L
n
(1
+
N
M
M
I 1
)
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(9
)–
(1
1)
.
T
h
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
of
th
e
ca
le
n
d
ar
ye
ar
an
d
F
am
a–
F
re
n
ch
48
in
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
ar
e
su
p
p
re
ss
ed
fo
r
b
re
v
it
y
in
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
co
lu
m
n
s.
D
et
ai
le
d
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s
of
al
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
A
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
∗,
∗∗
,
an
d
∗∗
∗d
en
ot
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,
5%
,
an
d
1%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
M
M
I
O
1
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
0
.7
1
4
*
*
*
0
.7
8
0
*
*
*
0
.5
6
5
*
*
[2
.6
5
]
[2
.8
7
]
[2
.3
8
]
M
M
I
O
1
0
.3
3
7
*
*
*
0
.3
3
3
*
*
*
0
.3
3
0
*
*
*
[2
8
.2
8
]
[2
6
.3
6
]
[2
6
.5
6
]
P
M
M
I 1
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
4
.8
7
9
*
*
*
5.
0
2
8
*
*
*
3
.9
4
9
*
*
*
[6
.3
8
]
[6
.5
3
]
[5
.3
4
]
P
M
M
I 1
1
.0
2
0
*
*
*
1
.0
1
1
*
*
*
1
.0
0
2
*
*
*
[1
7
.0
4
]
[1
6
.7
9
]
[1
6
.8
5
]
L
n
(1
+
N
M
M
I 1
)
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
0
.1
7
8
*
*
*
0
.1
8
8
*
*
*
0
.1
4
6
*
*
*
[6
.4
9
]
[6
.8
8
]
[5
.6
7
]
L
n
(1
+
N
M
M
I 1
)
0
.0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.0
4
9
*
*
*
0
.0
4
9
*
*
*
[2
9
.0
5
]
[2
7
.8
6
]
[2
8
.1
4
]
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
0.
77
2*
**
1
.5
2
9
*
*
*
1
.1
0
8
*
*
*
1
.1
2
5
*
*
*
1
.8
8
7
*
*
*
1
.0
6
4
*
*
*
1
.0
8
0
*
*
*
1
.8
2
2
*
*
*
1
.0
5
5
*
*
*
1
.0
7
1
*
*
*
1
.8
1
3
*
*
*
[3
8.
50
]
[3
9
.9
4
]
[3
6
.1
5
]
[3
6
.4
4
]
[3
7
.8
2
]
[3
4
.8
2
]
[3
5
.0
8
]
[3
6
.6
5
]
[3
3
.3
0
]
[3
3
.6
3
]
[3
5
.4
0
]
∆
E
a
rn
in
gs
0.
53
1*
**
0
.5
2
6
*
*
*
0
.5
4
6
*
*
*
0
.5
5
3
*
*
*
0
.5
4
3
*
*
*
0
.5
4
4
*
*
*
0
.5
5
1
*
*
*
0
.5
4
2
*
*
*
0
.5
4
5
*
*
*
0
.5
5
1
*
*
*
0
.5
4
2
*
*
*
[4
1.
43
]
[4
1
.5
1
]
[3
2
.2
4
]
[3
2
.4
7
]
[3
2
.3
9
]
[3
2
.1
4
]
[3
2
.4
1
]
[3
2
.3
5
]
[3
2
.2
1
]
[3
2
.4
4
]
[3
2
.4
0
]
∆
N
et
a
ss
et
s
0.
16
8*
**
0
.1
7
7
*
*
*
0
.1
7
8
*
*
*
0
.1
7
3
*
*
*
0
.1
8
5
*
*
*
0
.1
7
6
*
*
*
0
.1
7
1
*
*
*
0
.1
8
3
*
*
*
0
.1
7
4
*
*
*
0
.1
6
8
*
*
*
0
.1
8
0
*
*
*
[2
6.
19
]
[2
7
.9
8
]
[1
8
.6
7
]
[1
7
.9
9
]
[1
9
.4
6
]
[1
8
.5
3
]
[1
7
.8
6
]
[1
9
.2
9
]
[1
8
.2
3
]
[1
7
.4
9
]
[1
8
.9
0
]
∆
R
&
D
1.
25
9*
**
1
.1
7
1
*
*
*
0
.9
3
7
*
*
*
0
.9
5
2
*
*
*
0
.8
6
7
*
*
*
0
.9
2
5
*
*
*
0
.9
4
0
*
*
*
0
.8
5
5
*
*
*
0
.9
1
9
*
*
*
0
.9
3
2
*
*
*
0
.8
4
5
*
*
*
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
39
T
a
b
le
2
-
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
[9
.4
2]
[8
.8
7
]
[5
.9
8
]
[6
.0
7
]
[5
.5
6
]
[5
.9
0
]
[6
.0
1
]
[5
.5
0
]
[5
.8
6
]
[5
.9
6
]
[5
.4
4
]
∆
In
te
re
st
ex
pe
n
se
s
-1
.6
67
**
*
-1
.5
9
1
*
*
*
-2
.0
1
2
*
*
*
-2
.0
2
7
*
*
*
-1
.8
2
8
*
*
*
-2
.0
0
9
*
*
*
-2
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-1
.8
2
7
*
*
*
-2
.0
1
0
*
*
*
-2
.0
2
9
*
*
*
-1
.8
3
7
*
*
*
[-
19
.4
2]
[-
1
8
.7
5
]
[-
1
1
.5
4
]
[-
1
1
.4
7
]
[-
1
0
.5
5
]
[-
1
1
.5
3
]
[-
1
1
.4
5
]
[-
1
0
.5
6
]
[-
1
1
.5
4
]
[-
1
1
.5
1
]
[-
1
0
.6
1
]
∆
D
iv
id
en
d
s
3.
38
5*
**
3
.3
4
5
*
*
*
2
.0
7
5
*
*
*
2
.0
4
8
*
*
*
2
.0
3
2
*
*
*
1
.9
8
4
*
*
*
1.
9
4
3
*
*
*
1
.9
3
1
*
*
*
1
.9
5
8
*
*
*
1
.9
1
3
*
*
*
1
.9
0
1
*
*
*
[1
6.
86
]
[1
6
.7
6
]
[8
.4
7
]
[8
.3
6
]
[8
.2
6
]
[8
.1
0
]
[7
.9
4
]
[7
.8
5
]
[8
.0
1
]
[7
.8
3
]
[7
.7
4
]
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
t−
1
0.
31
4*
**
0
.2
4
8
*
*
*
0
.3
9
5
*
*
*
0
.4
4
4
*
*
*
0
.3
7
8
*
*
*
0
.3
9
6
*
*
*
0
.4
4
4
*
*
*
0
.3
8
2
*
*
*
0
.4
0
9
*
*
*
0
.4
6
3
*
*
*
0
.4
0
2
*
*
*
[2
5.
80
]
[1
9
.3
9
]
[2
6
.6
3
]
[2
7
.6
1
]
[2
2
.1
2
]
[2
6
.5
7
]
[2
7
.5
8
]
[2
2
.5
7
]
[2
7
.3
0
]
[2
8
.5
7
]
[2
3
.6
7
]
L
ev
er
a
ge
-0
.4
94
**
*
-0
.4
9
1
*
*
*
-0
.4
5
2
*
*
*
-0
.5
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.5
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.5
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.5
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.4
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
8
*
*
*
[-
58
.3
3]
[-
5
9
.3
2
]
[-
4
3
.9
6
]
[-
4
5
.6
1
]
[-
4
5
.8
2
]
[-
4
3
.2
1
]
[-
4
4
.9
2
]
[-
4
5
.1
8
]
[-
4
3
.2
2
]
[-
4
4
.7
4
]
[-
4
4
.9
8
]
N
et
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
0.
09
3*
**
0
.0
6
8
*
*
*
0
.0
5
4
*
*
*
0
.0
6
7
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
5
0
*
*
0
.0
6
5
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
5
9
*
*
*
0
.0
7
2
*
*
*
0
.0
3
5
*
[7
.2
8]
[5
.4
6
]
[2
.7
3
]
[3
.3
4
]
[1
.4
0
]
[2
.5
4
]
[3
.2
6
]
[1
.4
1
]
[2
.9
9
]
[3
.6
0
]
[1
.7
8
]
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
t−
1
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-0
.7
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.9
0
3
*
*
*
-0
.8
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.8
2
8
*
*
*
[-
1
2
.5
1
]
[-
1
1
.6
2
]
[-
1
0
.9
2
]
[-
1
0
.6
3
]
L
ev
er
a
ge
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-1
.6
0
9
*
*
*
-1
.7
6
4
*
*
*
-1
.7
5
3
*
*
*
-1
.7
7
4
*
*
*
[-
2
1
.1
6
]
[-
1
7
.7
5
]
[-
1
7
.7
0
]
[-
1
8
.0
1
]
C
on
st
an
t
0.
05
8*
**
0
.0
5
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
4
0
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
5
7
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
4
[1
8.
04
]
[1
8
.4
6
]
[-
8
.8
6
]
[0
.8
4
]
[0
.5
9
]
[-
9
.2
6
]
[0
.3
9
]
[0
.1
6
]
[-
1
2
.8
0
]
[0
.3
8
]
[0
.1
3
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
89
,5
55
8
9
,5
5
5
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
67
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
R
2
-a
d
ju
st
ed
0.
19
1
0
.2
0
4
0
.1
9
3
0
.2
0
2
0
.2
1
5
0
.1
9
7
0
.2
0
7
0
.2
1
8
0
.1
9
7
0
.2
0
7
0
.2
1
9
Y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
In
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
40
T
a
b
le
3
.
T
h
re
e
a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
d
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s
o
f
th
e
e
x
p
e
ct
e
d
ch
a
n
g
e
in
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
g
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
fi
rm
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
ch
an
ge
s
in
ca
sh
h
ol
d
in
gs
,
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
m
os
t
m
ot
iv
at
ed
m
on
it
or
in
g
IO
,
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
of
th
e
p
ri
or
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s,
an
d
co
n
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
of
67
,4
04
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
of
U
S
fi
rm
s
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
19
95
–2
01
5
w
it
h
re
q
u
ir
ed
d
at
a
fo
r
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
r i
t
−R
B it
,
th
e
an
n
u
al
ex
ce
ss
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
F
am
a
an
d
F
re
n
ch
(1
99
3)
25
si
ze
an
d
b
o
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
p
or
tf
ol
io
s.
∆
in
d
ic
at
es
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
va
ri
ab
le
fr
om
ye
ar
t
−
1
to
t.
∆
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e
ca
sh
ho
ld
in
gs
is
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
re
al
iz
ed
ch
an
ge
in
ca
sh
h
ol
d
in
gs
an
d
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
ch
an
ge
in
ca
sh
h
ol
d
in
gs
.
F
ol
lo
w
in
g
F
au
lk
en
d
er
an
d
W
an
g
(2
00
6)
,
w
e
d
efi
n
e
th
re
e
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
m
ea
su
re
s
of
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
ch
an
ge
in
ca
sh
h
ol
d
in
gs
fr
om
ye
ar
t
−
1
to
ye
ar
t:
(1
)
T
h
e
av
er
ag
e
ch
an
ge
in
ca
sh
h
ol
d
in
gs
of
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
F
am
a
an
d
F
re
n
ch
(1
99
3)
25
si
ze
an
d
b
o
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
b
en
ch
m
ar
k
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
ov
er
fi
sc
al
ye
ar
t;
(2
)
th
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
va
lu
e
of
th
e
A
lm
ei
d
a
et
al
.
(2
00
4)
re
gr
es
si
on
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
I:
∆
C
as
h
ho
ld
in
gs
i,
t
=
β
0
+
β
1
C
as
h
fl
ow
i,
t−
1
+
β
2
Q
i,
t−
1
+
β
3
S
iz
e i
.t
−1
+
In
du
st
ry
fi
xe
d
eff
ec
ts
+
 i
,t
;
(3
)
th
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
va
lu
e
of
th
e
A
lm
ei
d
a
et
al
.
(2
00
4)
re
gr
es
si
on
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
II
w
it
h
th
e
ad
d
it
io
n
al
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s:
ca
p
it
al
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s,
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
s,
ch
an
ge
in
n
et
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
,
an
d
ch
an
ge
in
sh
or
t-
te
rm
d
eb
t,
al
l
n
or
m
al
iz
ed
b
y
th
e
la
gg
ed
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
as
se
ts
.
T
h
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
of
th
e
ca
le
n
d
ar
ye
ar
an
d
F
am
a–
F
re
n
ch
48
in
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
ar
e
su
p
p
re
ss
ed
fo
r
b
re
v
it
y
in
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
co
lu
m
n
s.
D
et
ai
le
d
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s
of
al
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
A
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
∗,
∗∗
,
an
d
∗∗
∗d
en
ot
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,
5%
,
an
d
1%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
a
v
e
ra
g
e
A
lm
e
id
a
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
4
)
I
A
lm
e
id
a
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
4
)
II
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
M
M
I
O
1
×
∆
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
0
.6
7
1
*
*
0
.6
9
1
*
*
0
.4
9
8
*
*
0
.6
7
8
*
*
*
0
.7
6
1
**
*
0
.5
9
1*
*
0
.7
5
7
*
*
*
0
.8
5
0
*
*
*
0
.6
9
1
*
*
*
[2
.4
5
]
[2
.5
4
]
[2
.2
0
]
[2
.5
9
]
[2
.8
5]
[2
.5
7]
[2
.8
7
]
[3
.1
7
]
[3
.0
2
]
M
M
I
O
1
0
.3
6
1
*
*
*
0
.3
6
0
*
*
*
0
.3
6
1
*
*
*
0
.3
3
6
*
*
*
0
.3
3
3
*
*
*
0
.3
3
2
*
*
*
0
.3
1
2
*
*
*
0
.3
0
9
*
*
*
0
.3
0
8
*
*
*
[2
9
.1
7
]
[2
7
.3
9
]
[2
7
.9
1
]
[2
7
.3
8
]
[2
5
.5
0
]
[2
5
.5
8
]
[2
5
.7
2
]
[2
4
.0
1
]
[2
4
.1
4
]
∆
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
1
.0
8
3
*
*
*
1
.0
8
9
*
*
*
1
.6
8
5
*
*
*
1
.1
1
1
*
*
*
1
.1
3
5
*
*
*
1
.7
2
9
*
*
*
1
.0
6
3
*
*
*
1
.0
8
6
*
*
*
1
.6
5
4
*
*
*
[3
5
.1
7
]
[3
5
.2
8
]
[3
6
.5
4
]
[3
5
.4
3
]
[3
5
.8
8
]
[3
6
.7
0
]
[3
2
.5
8
]
[3
3
.0
4
]
[3
3
.3
0
]
∆
E
a
rn
in
gs
0
.5
5
7
*
*
*
0
.5
6
0
*
*
*
0
.5
5
2
*
*
*
0
.5
2
0
*
*
*
0
.5
2
6
*
*
*
0
.5
1
9
*
*
*
0
.5
2
9
*
*
*
0
.5
3
6
*
*
*
0
.5
2
9
*
*
*
[3
2
.5
6
]
[3
2
.6
9
]
[3
2
.5
7
]
[3
0
.2
5
]
[3
0
.4
5
]
[3
0
.3
3
]
[2
9
.3
1
]
[2
9
.5
5
]
[2
9
.4
6
]
∆
N
et
a
ss
et
s
0
.1
7
5
*
*
*
0
.1
7
0
*
*
*
0
.1
8
0
*
*
*
0
.1
9
5
*
*
*
0
.1
9
1
*
*
*
0
.2
0
1
*
*
*
0
.1
9
3
*
*
*
0
.1
8
9
*
*
*
0
.1
9
7
*
*
*
[1
8
.1
8
]
[1
7
.5
8
]
[1
8
.8
4
]
[1
9
.9
9
]
[1
9
.4
2
]
[2
0
.5
9
]
[1
9
.0
6
]
[1
8
.5
1
]
[1
9
.5
1
]
∆
R
&
D
0
.9
7
1
*
*
*
1
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.9
2
5
*
*
*
1
.1
3
6
*
*
*
1
.1
4
9
*
*
*
1
.1
0
3
*
*
*
1
.1
5
0
*
*
*
1
.1
5
5
*
*
*
1
.1
1
2
*
*
*
[6
.1
4
]
[6
.3
7
]
[5
.8
9
]
[7
.1
7
]
[7
.2
6]
[6
.9
9]
[6
.8
4
]
[6
.8
6
]
[6
.6
5
]
∆
In
te
re
st
ex
pe
n
se
s
-2
.0
4
6
*
*
*
-2
.0
6
0
*
*
*
-1
.8
8
0
*
*
*
-2
.1
2
8
*
*
*
-2
.1
4
1*
*
*
-1
.9
5
2*
*
*
-2
.1
9
4
*
*
*
-2
.2
0
4
*
*
*
-2
.0
2
3
*
*
*
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
41
T
a
b
le
3
-
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
a
v
e
ra
g
e
A
lm
e
id
a
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
4
)
I
A
lm
e
id
a
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
4
)
II
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
[-
1
1
.6
1
]
[-
1
1
.5
6
]
[-
1
0
.8
0
]
[-
1
1
.9
3
]
[-
1
1
.8
4
]
[-
1
1
.0
4
]
[-
1
1
.6
5
]
[-
1
1
.5
4
]
[-
1
0
.8
2
]
∆
D
iv
id
en
d
s
1
.9
8
9
*
*
*
2
.0
3
5
*
*
*
2
.0
3
1
*
*
*
2
.2
0
6
*
*
*
2
.2
0
4
*
*
*
2
.2
1
3
*
*
*
2
.1
5
9
*
*
*
2
.1
6
0
*
*
*
2
.1
7
5
*
*
*
[8
.1
0
]
[8
.2
9
]
[8
.2
7
]
[8
.7
4
]
[8
.7
3]
[8
.7
5]
[8
.3
3
]
[8
.3
3
]
[8
.3
9
]
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
t−
1
0
.3
8
6
*
*
*
0
.4
2
9
*
*
*
0
.4
0
6
*
*
*
0
.3
6
2
*
*
*
0
.4
1
1
*
*
*
0
.3
9
0
*
*
*
0
.3
3
7
*
*
*
0
.3
8
6
*
*
*
0
.3
6
6
*
*
*
[2
6
.0
9
]
[2
6
.9
6
]
[2
4
.8
2
]
[2
4
.9
1
]
[2
6
.1
8
]
[2
4
.1
4
]
[2
2
.7
1
]
[2
4
.0
5
]
[2
2
.0
6
]
L
ev
er
a
ge
-0
.4
6
1
*
*
*
-0
.5
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.5
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.4
5
6
*
*
*
-0
.5
4
4*
*
*
-0
.5
4
7*
*
*
-0
.4
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
5
*
*
*
[-
4
4
.6
6
]
[-
4
6
.0
6
]
[-
4
6
.1
2
]
[-
4
4
.1
5
]
[-
4
5
.8
9
]
[-
4
6
.1
8
]
[-
4
1
.2
0
]
[-
4
2
.9
9
]
[-
4
3
.3
4
]
N
et
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
0
.0
6
8
*
*
*
0
.0
8
2
*
*
*
0
.0
4
9
*
*
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
3
7
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
1
2
[3
.4
0
]
[4
.0
7
]
[2
.4
7
]
[1
.4
1
]
[1
.8
2]
[0
.0
8]
[0
.3
4
]
[0
.8
6
]
[-
0
.5
6
]
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
t−
1
×
∆
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-0
.5
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.4
6
9*
*
*
-0
.4
2
7
*
*
*
[-
8
.1
0
]
[-
7
.3
2
]
[-
6
.3
2
]
L
ev
er
a
ge
×
∆
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
ca
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-1
.3
2
5
*
*
*
-1
.4
2
8*
*
*
-1
.3
8
7
*
*
*
[-
1
6
.1
4
]
[-
1
7
.1
8
]
[-
1
5
.9
3
]
C
on
st
an
t
-0
.0
2
9
*
*
*
0
.0
4
2
0
.0
3
6
-0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
41
0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
*
0
.0
4
6
[-
6
.8
8
]
[1
.3
4
]
[1
.1
2
]
[-
5
.2
9
]
[1
.3
3
]
[1
.0
2
]
[-
4
.2
2
]
[1
.7
0
]
[1
.4
3
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
6
7
,4
0
4
6
6
,6
6
9
6
6
,6
6
9
6
6
,6
6
9
6
1
,6
2
6
6
1
,6
2
6
6
1
,6
2
6
R
2
-a
d
ju
st
ed
0
.1
9
0
0
.1
9
8
0
.2
0
9
0
.1
9
1
0
.2
01
0
.2
1
2
0
.1
8
5
0
.1
9
5
0
.2
0
6
Y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
In
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
42
T
a
b
le
4
.
M
o
st
m
o
ti
v
a
te
d
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
a
n
d
co
rp
o
ra
te
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
m
e
a
su
re
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
fi
rm
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
ch
an
ge
s
in
ca
sh
h
ol
d
in
gs
,
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
m
os
t
m
ot
iv
at
ed
m
on
it
or
in
g
IO
,
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
of
th
e
p
ri
or
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s,
an
d
co
n
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
of
67
,4
04
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
of
U
S
fi
rm
s
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
19
95
–2
01
5
w
it
h
re
q
u
ir
ed
d
at
a
fo
r
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
r i
t
−
R
B it
,
th
e
an
n
u
al
ex
ce
ss
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
F
am
a
an
d
F
re
n
ch
(1
99
3)
25
si
ze
an
d
b
o
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
p
or
tf
ol
io
s.
∆
in
d
ic
at
es
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
va
ri
ab
le
fr
om
ye
ar
t
−
1
to
t.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(1
)–
(3
),
w
e
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
G
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
th
e
G
om
p
er
s
et
al
.
(2
00
3)
in
d
ex
an
d
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
it
an
d
∆
C
as
h
ho
ld
in
gs
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(4
)–
(6
),
w
e
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
G
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
th
e
B
eb
ch
u
k
et
al
.
(2
00
9)
in
d
ex
an
d
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
it
an
d
∆
C
as
h
ho
ld
in
gs
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(1
)
an
d
(4
),
w
e
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
to
ta
l
in
st
it
u
ti
on
al
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(T
I
O
)
an
d
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
it
an
d
∆
C
as
h
ho
ld
in
gs
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(2
)
an
d
(5
),
w
e
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
b
lo
ck
h
ol
d
er
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(B
lo
ck
1)
an
d
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
it
an
d
∆
C
as
h
ho
ld
in
gs
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(3
)
an
d
(6
),
w
e
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
b
lo
ck
h
ol
d
er
ow
n
er
sh
ip
te
rc
il
e
d
u
m
m
y
(B
lo
ck
2)
an
d
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
it
an
d
∆
C
as
h
ho
ld
in
gs
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
co
n
tr
ol
s
fo
r
ca
le
n
d
ar
ye
ar
an
d
F
am
a–
F
re
n
ch
48
in
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
w
h
os
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
su
p
p
re
ss
ed
fo
r
b
re
v
it
y.
D
et
ai
le
d
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s
of
al
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
A
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
∗,
∗∗
,
an
d
∗∗
∗d
en
ot
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,
5%
,
an
d
1%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
G
o
m
p
e
rs
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
3
)
in
d
e
x
B
e
b
ch
u
k
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
9
)
in
d
e
x
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
M
M
I
O
1
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
1
.3
9
9
*
*
*
1
.4
9
0
*
*
*
2
.0
8
2
*
*
*
1
.0
02
*
*
1
.1
91
*
*
*
2
.0
5
5
*
*
*
[3
.5
4
]
[4
.0
8
]
[4
.9
4
]
[2
.5
5
]
[3
.2
1
]
[4
.5
4
]
M
M
I
O
1
0
.2
9
3
*
*
*
0
.3
1
0
*
*
*
0
.3
0
5
*
*
*
0
.2
8
8*
*
*
0
.2
9
5
*
*
*
0
.3
1
0
*
*
*
[1
5
.5
5
]
[1
6
.2
8
]
[1
2
.4
6
]
[1
6
.1
0
]
[1
6
.3
0
]
[1
2
.5
4
]
G
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
×∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-0
.0
4
2
*
-0
.0
4
3
*
-0
.0
5
0
*
-0
.1
00
*
*
-0
.0
8
8
*
*
-0
.0
7
7
[-
1
.7
8
]
[-
1
.7
9
]
[-
1
.6
6
]
[-
2
.2
5
]
[-
1
.9
8
]
[-
1
.4
1
]
G
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
[1
.5
9
]
[1
.6
8
]
[2
.3
5
]
[1
.6
9
]
[2
.3
6
]
[2
.7
6
]
T
I
O
0
.0
4
8
*
*
0
.0
3
5
[2
.2
3
]
[1
.5
9
]
T
I
O
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
0
.0
4
4
0
.1
3
4
[0
.1
6
]
[0
.4
4
]
B
lo
ck
1
-0
.1
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
44
*
*
*
[-
5
.3
7
]
[-
5.
7
5
]
B
lo
ck
1
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-0
.5
7
5
-0
.8
7
1
*
*
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
43
T
a
b
le
4
-
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
G
o
m
p
e
rs
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
3
)
in
d
e
x
B
e
b
ch
u
k
e
t
a
l.
(2
0
0
9
)
in
d
e
x
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
[-
1
.3
5
]
[-
2
.0
0
]
B
lo
ck
2
-0
.0
2
2
*
*
-0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
[-
2
.3
2
]
[-
2
.8
2
]
B
lo
ck
2
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-0
.2
5
8
-0
.3
6
3
*
[-
1
.3
4
]
[-
1
.7
0
]
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
1
.9
1
1
*
*
*
2
.0
5
1
*
*
*
1
.9
8
0
*
*
*
1
.8
3
8*
*
*
2
.0
4
0
*
*
*
1
.8
3
9
*
*
*
[6
.4
0
]
[7
.9
0
]
[6
.1
9
]
[6
.6
8
]
[9
.4
3
]
[6
.2
3
]
∆
E
a
rn
in
gs
0
.5
9
2
*
*
*
0
.5
8
7
*
*
*
0
.6
1
4
*
*
*
0
.6
1
3*
*
*
0
.6
0
7
*
*
*
0
.6
4
8
*
*
*
[1
5
.0
5
]
[1
4
.8
7
]
[1
2
.8
3
]
[1
4
.4
3
]
[1
4
.2
6
]
[1
1
.7
4
]
∆
N
et
a
ss
et
s
0
.1
3
7
*
*
*
0
.1
3
7
*
*
*
0
.1
1
1
*
*
*
0
.1
4
5*
*
*
0
.1
4
4
*
*
*
0
.1
2
2
*
*
*
[6
.1
9
]
[6
.2
0
]
[3
.9
8
]
[6
.3
1
]
[6
.2
5
]
[3
.7
7
]
∆
R
&
D
0
.1
5
0
0
.1
5
2
0
.2
1
8
0
.1
9
4
0
.1
8
7
-0
.0
2
0
[0
.3
7
]
[0
.3
8
]
[0
.4
6
]
[0
.4
7
]
[0
.4
6
]
[-
0
.0
4
]
∆
In
te
re
st
ex
pe
n
se
s
-2
.3
4
0
*
*
*
-2
.3
0
8
*
*
*
-1
.6
9
8
*
*
*
-2
.7
2
6*
*
*
-2
.6
7
9
*
*
*
-1
.7
7
3
*
*
*
[-
5
.1
4
]
[-
5
.0
5
]
[-
3
.2
8
]
[-
5
.5
3
]
[-
5.
4
3
]
[-
2
.8
7
]
∆
D
iv
id
en
d
s
0
.7
1
8
0
.6
6
5
1
.2
9
5
*
*
0
.8
77
*
0
.8
2
2
*
0
.9
6
1
[1
.4
8
]
[1
.3
6
]
[2
.2
6
]
[1
.8
6
]
[1
.7
2
]
[1
.4
7
]
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
t−
1
0
.4
1
0
*
*
*
0
.4
1
6
*
*
*
0
.3
6
9
*
*
*
0
.4
2
9
*
*
*
0
.4
33
*
*
*
0
.3
8
2
*
*
*
[1
1
.1
7
]
[1
1
.1
3
]
[8
.6
4
]
[1
1
.2
3
]
[1
1.
1
1
]
[8
.1
2
]
L
ev
er
a
ge
-0
.4
7
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.4
5
4
*
*
*
-0
.4
5
3*
*
*
-0
.4
4
2
*
*
*
-0
.4
4
8
*
*
*
[-
2
0
.3
1
]
[-
1
9
.5
2
]
[-
1
6
.8
7
]
[-
1
8
.9
4
]
[-
1
8
.3
2
]
[-
1
5
.4
9
]
N
et
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
-0
.1
1
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
2
2
*
*
-0
.1
01
*
*
-0
.1
0
0
*
*
-0
.1
2
0
*
*
[-
2
.6
1
]
[-
2
.6
1
]
[-
2
.3
5
]
[-
2
.2
6
]
[-
2.
2
0
]
[-
2
.1
1
]
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
t−
1
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-0
.6
5
9
*
*
*
-0
.6
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.6
6
9
*
*
-0
.6
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.6
10
*
*
*
-0
.6
1
2
*
*
[-
3
.1
5
]
[-
3
.0
6
]
[-
2
.5
7
]
[-
2
.8
4
]
[-
2
.7
3
]
[-
2
.1
1
]
L
ev
er
a
ge
×
∆
C
a
sh
h
o
ld
in
gs
-1
.6
9
4
*
*
*
-1
.6
8
1
*
*
*
-1
.3
5
1
*
*
*
-1
.6
6
4
*
*
*
-1
.6
56
*
*
*
-1
.2
8
6
*
*
*
[-
6
.3
6
]
[-
6
.4
5
]
[-
4
.6
0
]
[-
5
.7
9
]
[-
5
.9
1
]
[-
3
.7
5
]
C
on
st
an
t
-0
.0
7
1
-0
.0
2
7
-0
.0
6
6
-0
.0
84
*
*
-0
.0
4
7
-0
.0
4
1
[-
1
.3
0
]
[-
0
.5
1
]
[-
1
.1
2
]
[-
1
.9
7
]
[-
1
.1
6
]
[-
0
.7
0
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1
7
,3
4
1
1
7
,3
4
1
1
0
,5
1
9
1
6
,9
7
3
1
6
,9
7
3
9
,2
7
0
R
2
-a
d
ju
st
ed
0
.2
1
7
0
.2
1
8
0
.2
2
2
0
.2
1
9
0
.2
2
1
0
.2
3
0
Y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
44
Table 5. Most motivated monitoring institutional ownership by institutional
investor type
This table reports the OLS regressions of firm excess returns on changes in cash holdings,
proxies for most motivated monitoring IO, the interaction of the prior two variables, and
control variables. The sample consists of 67,404 firm-year observations of US firms over the
sample period 1995–2015 with required data for the regressions. The dependent variable is
rit−RBit , the annual excess stock return relative to the Fama and French (1993) 25 size and
book-to-market portfolios. ∆ indicates the change in the corresponding variable from year
t−1 to t. In columns (1) and (2), we divide MMIO1 into most motivated monitoring inde-
pendent IO (MMIO1,Independent) and most motivated monitoring grey IO (MMIO1,Grey).
In columns (3)–(5), we follow Bushee (1998) and divide MMIO1 into most motivated
monitoring transient IO (MMIO1,Transient), most motivated monitoring quasi-indexer IO
(MMIO1,Quasi-indexer), and most motivated monitoring dedicated IO (MMIO1,Dedicated).
All regressions include controls for calendar year and Fama–French 48 industry fixed ef-
fects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Detailed definitions of all variables are
described in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are
reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MMIO1,Independent ×∆Cash holdings 0.769**
[2.03]
MMIO1,Grey ×∆Cash holdings 1.424***
[2.72]
MMIO1,Transient ×∆Cash holdings 1.903*
[1.93]
MMIO1,Quasi-indexer ×∆Cash holdings 0.620*
[1.95]
MMIO1,Dedicated ×∆Cash holdings 0.118
[0.17]
MMIO1,Independent 0.507***
[27.56]
MMIO1,Grey 0.364***
[11.63]
MMIO1,Transient 1.034***
[20.73]
MMIO1,Quasi-indexer 0.319***
[20.34]
MMIO1,Dedicated 0.521***
[10.00]
∆Cash holdings 1.128*** 1.160*** 1.122*** 1.159*** 1.169***
[36.44] [39.67] [34.63] [38.67] [41.13]
∆Earnings 0.553*** 0.552*** 0.551*** 0.552*** 0.552***
[32.48] [32.34] [32.35] [32.41] [32.30]
∆Net assets 0.172*** 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.180*** 0.184***
[17.88] [18.99] [17.99] [18.77] [19.16]
∆R&D 0.940*** 0.985*** 0.914*** 0.986*** 0.974***
[6.00] [6.27] [5.83] [6.28] [6.19]
Continued on next page
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Table 5 - continued from previous page
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Interest expenses -2.023*** -2.035*** -2.008*** -2.039*** -2.025***
[-11.45] [-11.52] [-11.34] [-11.55] [-11.48]
∆Dividends 2.020*** 2.184*** 2.091*** 2.106*** 2.227***
[8.28] [8.86] [8.54] [8.56] [9.05]
Cash holdingst−1 0.446*** 0.423*** 0.431*** 0.435*** 0.413***
[27.70] [26.62] [27.34] [27.22] [26.22]
Leverage -0.536*** -0.550*** -0.539*** -0.545*** -0.552***
[-45.43] [-46.78] [-46.16] [-46.35] [-46.98]
Net financing 0.069*** 0.051** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.047**
[3.42] [2.55] [2.74] [2.98] [2.34]
Constant 0.026 0.046 0.037 0.045 0.037
[0.85] [1.48] [1.18] [1.49] [1.20]
Observations 67,404 67,404 67,404 67,404 67,404
R2-adjusted 0.204 0.196 0.204 0.198 0.196
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8. Using high-dimensional fixed effects to mitigate endogeneity concerns
This table reports the OLS regressions of firm excess returns on changes in cash holdings,
most motivated monitoring IO, the interaction of the prior two variables, and control
variables. The sample consists of 67,404 firm-year observations of US firms over the sample
period 1995–2015 with required data for the regressions. The dependent variable is rit−RBit ,
the annual excess stock return relative to the Fama and French (1993) 25 size and book-to-
market portfolios. ∆ indicates the change in the corresponding variable from year t− 1 to
t. Following Gormley and Matsa (2014), we use the high-dimensional fixed effects model
to control for unobserved firm characteristics. In columns (1) and (2), we control for the
firm and year fixed effects. In columns (3) and (4), we control for the firm × year ×
Fama–French 48 industry fixed effects. The coefficients of fixed effects are suppressed for
brevity. Detailed definitions of all variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
MMIO1 ×∆Cash holdings 0.434*** 0.419*** 0.383*** 0.370***
[15.94] [15.64] [14.46] [14.13]
MMIO1 0.838*** 0.748*** 0.625*** 0.565***
[3.53] [3.57] [2.91] [2.90]
∆Cash holdings 1.264*** 1.925*** 1.219*** 1.831***
[38.53] [37.46] [37.78] [36.55]
∆Earnings 0.473*** 0.466*** 0.459*** 0.453***
[28.48] [28.41] [27.82] [27.74]
∆Net assets 0.122*** 0.132*** 0.123*** 0.131***
[11.43] [12.47] [11.68] [12.64]
∆R&D 0.723*** 0.661*** 0.682*** 0.621***
[4.37] [4.02] [4.15] [3.81]
∆Interest expenses -1.216*** -1.049*** -1.094*** -0.937***
[-6.66] [-5.84] [-6.11] [-5.32]
∆Dividends 1.064*** 1.079*** 1.273*** 1.292***
[4.21] [4.25] [5.20] [5.24]
Cash holdingst−1 1.032*** 0.974*** 1.012*** 0.961***
[40.95] [37.79] [40.78] [37.75]
Leverage -1.154*** -1.154*** -1.115*** -1.118***
[-49.76] [-49.80] [-49.26] [-49.51]
Net financing 0.136*** 0.101*** 0.128*** 0.097***
[6.13] [4.64] [5.89] [4.53]
Cash holdingst−1 ×∆Cash holdings -0.645*** -0.569***
[-8.06] [-7.21]
Leverage × ∆Cash holdings -1.865*** -1.785***
[-18.34] [-17.76]
Observations 67,404 67,404 67,404 67,404
R2-adjusted 0.251 0.262 0.297 0.306
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Firm × Year × Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes
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Table 9. Using changes in most motivated monitoring institutional ownership
to mitigate endogeneity concerns
This table reports the OLS regressions of firm excess returns on changes in cash holdings,
changes in most motivated monitoring IO, the interaction of the prior two variables, and
control variables. The sample consists of 67,404 firm-year observations of US firms over the
sample period 1995–2015 with required data for the regressions. The dependent variable
is rit −RBit , the annual excess stock return relative to the Fama and French (1993) 25 size
and book-to-market portfolios. ∆′MMIO1 represents the change in MMIO1 from March
to September year t. ∆ indicates the change in the corresponding variable from year t− 1
to t. The coefficients of the calendar year and Fama–French 48 industry fixed effects are
suppressed for brevity in columns (2) and (3). Detailed definitions of all variables are
described in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are
reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
∆′MMIO1 ×∆Cash holdings 1.617*** 1.629*** 1.438***
[2.91] [3.00] [2.70]
∆′MMIO1 1.022*** 1.013*** 1.002***
[30.72] [30.59] [30.26]
∆Cash holdings 1.120*** 1.139*** 1.893***
[39.92] [40.20] [40.55]
∆Earnings 0.534*** 0.543*** 0.533***
[31.63] [31.95] [31.89]
∆Net assets 0.189*** 0.184*** 0.196***
[20.03] [19.34] [20.80]
∆R&D 0.946*** 0.956*** 0.873***
[6.04] [6.10] [5.60]
∆Interest expenses -2.010*** -2.012*** -1.813***
[-11.60] [-11.46] [-10.53]
∆Dividends 2.325*** 2.269*** 2.251***
[9.53] [9.32] [9.21]
Cash holdingst−1 0.353*** 0.399*** 0.332***
[24.37] [25.50] [20.00]
Leverage -0.454*** -0.542*** -0.541***
[-44.81] [-46.30] [-46.40]
Net financing 0.025 0.040** 0.001
[1.29] [2.04] [0.06]
Cash holdingst−1 ×∆Cash holdings -0.914***
[-12.02]
Leverage × ∆Cash holdings -1.750***
[-17.62]
Constant 0.009** 0.043 0.036
[2.55] [1.43] [1.17]
Observations 67,404 67,404 67,404
R2-adjusted 0.200 0.210 0.222
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes
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Table 10. Monitoring motivation-weighted institutional ownership and the
marginal value of cash
This table reports the regressions of firm excess returns on changes in cash holdings, mon-
itoring motivation-weighted IO (TMA), the interaction of the prior two variables, and
control variables. The sample consists of 67,404 firm-year observations of US firms over
the sample period 1995–2015 with required data for the regressions. The dependent vari-
able is rit−RBit , the annual excess stock return relative to the Fama and French (1993) 25
size and book-to-market portfolios. ∆ indicates the change in the corresponding variable
from year t− 1 to t. Columns (1)–(2) report the OLS regression results. Columns (3)–(4)
report the second stage regression results of the 2SLS regressions similar to those reported
in Panel A of Table 7. The coefficients of the calendar year and Fama–French 48 industry
fixed effects are suppressed for brevity. Detailed definitions of all variables are described
in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are reported
in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
OLS 2SLS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
TMA×∆Cash holdings 0.037** 0.039***
[2.52] [2.69]
TMA 0.032*** 0.034***
[22.66] [22.18]
IV TMA×∆Cash holdings 0.221*** 0.023***
[14.58] [6.53]
IV TMA 0.466*** 0.238***
[9.93] [7.08]
∆Cash holdings 1.063*** 1.078*** -0.021 0.624***
[25.89] [26.19] [-0.18] [7.61]
∆Earnings 0.550*** 0.556*** 0.568*** 0.543***
[32.40] [32.64] [33.30] [31.99]
∆Net assets 0.178*** 0.171*** 0.093*** 0.182***
[18.50] [17.70] [7.91] [18.67]
∆R&D 0.883*** 0.900*** 0.419** 0.924***
[5.63] [5.75] [2.57] [5.84]
∆Interest expenses -2.019*** -2.037*** -1.915*** -2.006***
[-11.54] [-11.50] [-11.09] [-11.56]
∆Dividends 2.149*** 2.117*** 1.280*** 2.197***
[8.79] [8.66] [5.06] [8.89]
Cash holdingst−1 0.384*** 0.440*** 0.491*** 0.362***
[26.28] [27.77] [26.11] [24.70]
Leverage -0.451*** -0.536*** -0.370*** -0.457***
[-44.42] [-45.75] [-31.07] [-43.68]
Net financing 0.048** 0.061*** 0.180*** 0.041**
[2.44] [3.04] [7.95] [2.05]
Constant -0.081*** -0.019 -0.617*** -0.056***
[-14.03] [-0.61] [-14.30] [-5.11]
Observations 67,404 67,404 67,404 67,404
R2-adjusted 0.192 0.202 0.192 0.187
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes
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Table 11. Re-examination of the relation between MMIO1 and the value of
cash across three cash regimes
This table reports the 2SLS regressions of firm excess returns on changes in cash holdings,
proxies for most motivated monitoring IO, the interaction of the prior two variables, and
control variables. The sample consists of 67,404 firm-year observations of US firms over the
sample period 1995–2015 with required data for the regressions. ∆ indicates the change in
the corresponding variable from year t−1 to t. Column (1) reports the first stage regression
results. The dependent variable in the first stage regression is MMIO1. The IVs used are
the same as those used in Panel A of Table 7. Columns (2)–(4) report the second stage
regression results. The dependent variable in the second stage regression is rit − RBit , the
annual excess stock return relative to the Fama and French (1993) 25 size and book-to-
market portfolios. The independent variables of interest in the second stage regressions are
IVMMIO1, the predicted MMIO1 by the first stage regressions, and its interaction with
∆Cash holdings. We follow Halford et al. (2016) and define three cash regimes. Firms in
the raising cash regime issue equity and do not pay dividends, firms in the distributing
cash regime pay dividends or repurchase equity, and firms in the servicing debt regime
have market leverage ratio in the top decile of all firms and do not raise or distribute
cash. All regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama–French 48
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Detailed definitions of
all variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
First stage Second stage
MMIO1 rit −RBit
Raising cash Distributing cash Servicing debt
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
IV MMIO1 ×∆Cash holdings 3.872*** 1.550** 1.522
[4.10] [2.43] [1.60]
IV MMIO1 1.204*** 0.233 -1.816*
[3.23] [1.14] [-1.67]
R1TR2 0.011**
[2.21]
R2TN -0.056***
[-20.55]
R2TR1 0.073***
[13.00]
NTR2 -0.064***
[-21.30]
∆Cash holdings 0.028*** 1.469*** 0.839*** 0.487***
[5.54] [15.97] [12.19] [5.03]
∆Earnings -0.004** 0.418*** 0.564*** 0.308***
[-2.47] [9.22] [18.28] [7.45]
∆Net assets 0.039*** 0.219*** 0.182*** 0.103**
[20.07] [6.84] [10.04] [2.30]
∆R&D 0.092*** 0.755** 1.154*** 1.138
[4.40] [2.56] [3.42] [1.18]
Continued on next page
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Table 11 - continued from previous page
First stage Second stage
MMIO1 rit −RBit
Raising cash Distributing cash Servicing debt
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Interest expenses 0.019 -0.780 -2.200*** -0.714**
[0.78] [-1.63] [-6.82] [-2.26]
∆Dividends 0.536*** 3.785*** 2.195*** 1.234
[9.30] [2.98] [7.08] [0.73]
Cash holdingst−1 -0.110*** 1.012*** 0.265*** 0.313**
[-19.92] [16.40] [8.37] [2.47]
Leverage -0.051*** -0.918*** -0.375*** -1.861***
[-7.71] [-19.25] [-19.92] [-8.26]
Net financing -0.076*** 0.124** -0.140*** -0.165*
[-17.37] [2.01] [-3.71] [-1.71]
Constant 0.094*** 0.092 -0.014 0.970***
[3.67] [0.67] [-0.32] [4.28]
Observations 63,973 8,782 27,563 1,579
R2-adjusted 0.108 0.263 0.173 0.341
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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